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ABSTRACT 
 
How curiosity drives actions and learning: 
Dopamine, reward, and information seeking 
 
Caroline Braun Marvin 
 
 
Curiosity drives many of our daily pursuits and interactions; yet, we know 
surprisingly little about how it works. Here, I harness an idea implied in many 
conceptualizations of curiosity – that information has value in and of itself. Reframing 
curiosity as the motivation to obtain reward – where the reward is information – allows 
me to leverage major advances in theoretical and computational mechanisms of reward-
motivated learning. Using willingness to wait, an established measure of reward-
motivated behavior, I test the reward value of information, finding that people are more 
willing to wait for information about which they’re more curious. I then provide new 
evidence supporting several predictions that emerge from this information-as-reward 
framework.  
 
In Chapter 1, I examine whether the valence of information affects its reward 
value, finding an asymmetric effect of positive vs. negative information, with positive 
valence associated with both enhanced curiosity and enhanced long-term memory for 
information. I then test an idea drawn from computational and neurobiological accounts 
of reward learning, which suggest that it is not the absolute value of information that 
drives learning, but, rather, the gap between the reward expected and the reward received. 
By asking people to rate both their curiosity about a question and their satisfaction with 
the answer, I obtain measures of the values of the reward expected (curiosity) and the 
reward received (satisfaction) and find that the discrepancy between the two – the 
information prediction error – facilitates learning.  
 
These findings suggest a conceptual correspondence between dopaminergic 
mechanisms of reward learning and curiosity. Aging is associated with decrements in 
dopaminergic functioning, but it is unclear whether these deficits extend to curiosity, as 
few behavioral investigations of curiosity and aging exist. In Chapter 2, I, therefore, 
sought to explore the effects of aging on curiosity, providing behavioral evidence that 
curiosity is not diminished in aging, but, rather, that it is enhanced. These findings also 
revealed that older adults are more likely to wait for more positive information, consistent 
with existing theories of emotional processing.  
 
In Chapter 3, I sought to test whether the dopaminergic reward system, 
particularly the striatum, plays a necessary and causal role in curiosity by examining 
curiosity in patients with Parkinson’s disease, a neurological disorder characterized by 
dopamine depletion in the striatum and striatal dysfunction. I provide evidence for 
diminished curiosity in people with Parkinson’s disease, relative to age- and education-
matched controls. In particular, I find that participants with Parkinson’s disease are less 
likely to wait for lower-value rewards, i.e., information about which they’re less curious.    
 
Taken together, these results support the idea that information functions as a 
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In November 2012, Peter Molyneux and his video gaming company, 22Cans 
introduced the game “Curiosity – What’s Inside the Cube?” (Tanz, 2012). The game, or 
“experiment” as Molyneux called it, involved a large black cube comprising billions of 
smaller “cubelets” (Rigney, 2012). Players could “chip away” at the cubelets to get closer 
and closer to the center of the cube. Molyneux promised that what was inside the cube 
was “life-changingly amazing by any definition” (Tanz, 2012). Over 150 days, 
approximately four million people chipped away at 25 billion cubelets, wanting to be the 
one person who chipped away at that final cubelet and gained access to the secret inside 
the box (22CansOffical, 2013).  
 
Such is the power of curiosity. Yet for something that drives many of our daily 
pursuits and interactions, we know surprisingly little about it. Prior research has 
examined curiosity at a trait level, looking for group differences across demographic 
parameters and exploring connections between trait curiosity and other personality 
dimensions and life outcomes. Higher trait curiosity has been linked to improved 
academic performance (Kashdan & Yuen, 2007) and higher scores on intelligence 
measures (Raine, Reynolds, Venables, and Mednick, 2002). Trait curiosity has also been 
found to be associated with positive physical and mental health outcomes. Those higher 
in curiosity report enhanced psychological well-being (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 
2004), greater tendencies to engage in “growth-oriented” activities and perceived purpose 
in life (Kashdan & Steger, 2007), and even higher rates of longevity (Swan & Carmelli, 
1996). Although compelling, such studies rely primarily on self-reports and tend to gloss 
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over considerable variation in state-level curiosity, where some interesting and important 
questions arise.  
 
Many philosophers and psychologists have, thus, chosen to focus on state-level 
aspects of curiosity, often further subdividing curiosity into different components. 
William James described one type of curiosity as an almost automatic response of interest 
upon seeing something new. He suggested that this type of curiosity promoted 
exploration but it could also induce anxiety. James distinguished this tendency to explore 
from what he called “scientific curiosity,” which he characterized as the brain’s response 
“to an inconsistency or gap in its knowledge,” the resolving or filling of which brings 
pleasure (James, 1890). 
 
Perhaps the first psychologist to offer a formal account of curiosity, Daniel 
Berlyne (1960; 1966) also divided curiosity into two distinct realms. He posited 
“diversive curiosity” as a sort of antidote to boredom, the motivation underlying an 
animal’s tendency to spend time seeking and interacting with stimuli “for their own 
sake,” i.e., not because they produce any obvious evolutionary or ecological benefit. In 
contrast, “specific curiosity” would be aroused more in response to a particular problem 
or question. Berlyne suggested that stimuli that were complex, uncertain, novel, or 
conflicting could all arouse curiosity and that diversive and specific curiosity could work 




Berlyne (1966) attempted to measure curiosity in its different forms, 
demonstrating that, at least to some degree, curiosity can be quantified and compared. In 
so doing, he was able to collect a set of observations about the situational determinants of 
curiosity. In one study of specific, epistemic curiosity, Berlyne presented participants 
with a list of questions about animals, asking them to rate their level of curiosity about 
the answer to each question. Individuals reported being most curious about questions 
about animals with which they were most familiar, about questions that were somehow 
surprising, and about questions that suggested that an animal had a characteristic it was 
unlikely to possess. After rating their curiosity, participants were shown the answers to 
all the questions. They were then given the list of questions again and asked to answer 
each one. As hypothesized, Berlyne (1966) found that participants were more likely to 
remember the answers to the questions they were most curious about, a finding that has 
been replicated multiple times since.  
 
Critically, Berlyne suggested that specific curiosity arises when an animal is 
discomfited by uncertainty or a lack of information. Several theorists subsequently 
echoed this notion, suggesting that curiosity is the motivation to resolve uncertainty 
(Kagan, 1972) and even that it was “positively painful to deny” the brain its ability to 
perform its primary functions – to perceive and to know (Nissen, 1954). 
 
Loewenstein (1994) built on Berlyne’s notion of discomfort caused by 
uncertainty, while harkening back to the “gap” in knowledge described by James. 
Loewenstein posited an “information gap” theory of curiosity, suggesting that curiosity is 
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the result of a perceived gap between what one knows and what one wants to know. The 
information gap theory helps to distinguish situations that would engender high curiosity 
from those that would engender low curiosity. Further, it aims to describe in more 
concrete terms the subjective value of that which curiosity seeks: information.  
 
Indeed, the idea that information has value in and of itself – that it is rewarding – 
is implied in many of our conceptualizations of curiosity. But so far there has been scarce 
experimental evidence supporting this notion. In the studies described in this dissertation, 
I aimed to better understand curiosity through the lens of reward. I posit that information 
may serve as a reward and that curiosity, then, reflects the anticipation of that reward. 
Using this information-as-reward hypothesis to understand curiosity isn’t just intuitively 
compelling; it enables me to leverage recent advances in understanding the link between 
reward, motivation, and learning and leads to specific, testable predictions about what 
sparks curiosity and how curiosity drives learning. 
 
The value of rewards is discounted over time, and people are more willing to wait 
for rewards they value more highly (Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Hayden, 
Parikh, Deaner & Platt, 2007; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007). 
Harnessing this willingness-to-wait principle, I created a paradigm that is a variant of an 
inter-temporal choice task, an established measure of reward value in the behavioral 
economics literature (for a review, see Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002). In 
this paradigm, participants were given the opportunity to choose whether or not to wait to 
receive information, in this case, the answers to trivia questions. If curiosity reflects the 
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anticipation of reward, where the reward is information, participants would be expected 
to show greater willingness to wait for information that they consider more valuable, i.e., 
information that engenders greater curiosity.  
 
Across three studies, I examined the following questions about curiosity and 
learning:  
Study 1: How does curiosity drive learning?  
a. How does valence affect informational value and subsequent 
learning?  
Study 2: How is curiosity affected in healthy aging?  
Study 3: Is there a role for dopamine in curiosity?  
 
Below, I provide additional background on each question, followed by an outline 
of how these questions are addressed in the following chapters.  
 
Study 1: How does curiosity drive learning? 
A key finding from computational and neurobiological accounts of reward-guided 
learning is that it is not the absolute value of a reward that drives learning, but, rather, the 
difference between the expected value of the reward and the value of the reward actually 
received (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; for a review, see Schultz, 2006). Separately, 
Loewenstein’s information gap theory suggests that curiosity is driven in part by our 
predictions about whether information will satisfy our curiosity. Indeed, satisfaction is an 
important complement to curiosity but has received limited experimental attention. Here, 
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I propose that curiosity reflects the anticipated reward value of information and that 
satisfaction reflects the actual reward value experienced. Drawing on the robust literature 
suggesting that the discrepancy between the reward received and the reward anticipated – 
the reward prediction error – is an important driver of learning, I hypothesize that the 
discrepancy between satisfaction and curiosity – the information prediction error – may 
be an important factor in how curiosity supports learning.  
 
Study 1a: How does valence affect informational value and subsequent learning?  
Prior work suggests that valence – of information, of feedback, etc. – plays an 
important role in reward-motivated behavior and learning (e.g., Berns, Chappelow, 
Cekic, Zink, Pagnoni, & Martin-Skurski, 2006; Wittmann, Schiltz, Boehler, & Düzel, 
2008). People differentially seek out positive vs. negative information, depending on a 
variety of personality and situational factors (De Wall & Baumeister, 2007; Nes & 
Segerstrom, 2006). And a large body of research suggests that people are more likely to 
remember more valenced, relative to neutral, information (for a review, see LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006). Thus, an important question is how the valence of information affects its 
value and, therefore, how valence affects curiosity and subsequent learning. I investigate 
the effects of the valence of information on curiosity and learning, hypothesizing that 
people will be more likely to wait for and to remember more valenced information.  
 
Study 2: How is curiosity affected in healthy aging?  
Curiosity is often associated with youth (Beiser, 1984; Fowler, 1965; Kakar, 
1976; Kreitler, Zigler, & Kreitler, 1975). No less an authority than William James 
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suggested that curiosity disappears by age 25 (James, 1893). If information serves as a 
reward, we expect that curiosity relies, at least to some extent, on the dopaminergic 
reward system in the brain. Behavioral and neural evidence suggest that aging is 
associated with deficits in reward processing and reward-motivated behavior (Dreher, 
Meyer-Lindenberg, Kohn, & Berman, 2008; Mell, Wartenburger, Marschner, Villringer, 
Reischies, & Heekeren, 2009; Schott, Niehaus, Wittmann, Schütze, Seidenbecher, 
Heinze, & Düzel, 2007). Therefore, an important question is whether these age-related 
deficits extend to information and, thus, whether curiosity is diminished in older adults. 
Few studies have examined the effects of healthy aging on curiosity behaviorally, and 
self-report measures have suggested no age-related declines in curiosity. Based on the 
self-report findings and on evidence suggesting that age-related deficits in reward 
processing are restricted to certain types of tasks, specifically those that require 
anticipating probabilistic or uncertain reward outcomes, I hypothesize that there will be 
no significant difference in curiosity between healthy older and younger adults.  
 
Further, a robust literature suggests a positivity bias among older adults, such that 
they are more likely to attend to and remember more positive information (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005). I, therefore, test the extent to which this positivity bias extends to 







Study 3: Is there a role for dopamine in curiosity?  
Finally, if curiosity relies on the dopaminergic reward system, this raises an 
important question as to how curiosity might be affected in neurological disorders known 
to alter dopaminergic functioning. While behavioral and neural findings have suggested 
an important role for the striatum and its dopaminergic inputs in curiosity, it remains 
unknown whether striatal function plays a necessary and causal role in curiosity. Thus, I 
examine curiosity in people with Parkinson’s disease, a neurological disorder 
characterized by dopamine depletion leading to striatal dysfunction (Dauer & 
Przedborski, 2003), hypothesizing that people with Parkinson’s disease will show 
diminished curiosity relative to age- and education-matched controls. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
In Chapter 1, I test the information-as-reward hypothesis, examining decisions to 
wait for information and subsequent memory in a population of undergraduate students. 
In this study, I provide evidence (I) that people are more willing to wait for higher-value 
information, suggesting that information does function as a reward; (II) that information 
prediction errors are a potential mechanism through which curiosity drives learning; and 
(III) that the valence of information affects its value, such that people are more willing to 
wait for and more likely to remember more positive information.  
 
In Chapter 2, I examine differences in curiosity ratings and choices to wait for 
information between younger adults and healthy older adults. I find that healthy older 
adults exhibit enhanced curiosity and willingness to wait for information, compared to 
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younger adults. And I provide evidence that the well-known positivity bias associated 
with aging extends to curiosity, finding that older adults are more likely to wait for 
positive information.  
 
In Chapter 3, I explore the extent to which curiosity is affected by Parkinson’s 
disease, a neurological disorder characterized by dopaminergic dysregulation, which lists 
deficits in reward processing among its symptoms. I provide evidence suggesting a causal 
role for the dopaminergic reward system in curiosity, finding that people with 
Parkinson’s disease report lower curiosity ratings and make fewer choices to wait for 
information, compared to age- and education-matched controls.  
 
Finally, in the Appendix, I report the results of a separate study, which attempts to 
better characterize curiosity and satisfaction as constructs. In this study, we asked a large 
online sample to rate their curiosity and satisfaction and to report the extent to which a 
variety of factors contributed to these subjective ratings. Throughout our studies, we find 
a great deal of consistency in curiosity and satisfaction ratings. However, this exploratory 
study suggests that beneath that consistency lies considerable variability in the ways in 














Curiosity and reward:  
Valence predicts choice and information prediction errors enhance learning 
 
Introduction 
Curiosity is a powerful force. Yet for something that drives many of our daily 
pursuits, we know surprisingly little about it. Psychologists have long struggled to 
provide a formal account of curiosity. It has been defined as “an inconsistency or gap” in 
knowledge (James, 1890), and has been suggested to arise when an animal is discomfited 
by uncertainty or a lack of information (Berlyne, 1960). Building on these ideas, 
Loewenstein (1994) posited an information gap theory of curiosity, suggesting that 
curiosity is the result of a perceived gap between what one knows and what one wants to 
know. An innovation of this theory is that it aims to describe, in more concrete terms, the 
subjective value of that which curiosity seeks: information. Indeed, the idea that 
information has value in and of itself – that it is rewarding – is implied in many of our 
conceptualizations of curiosity. But so far there has been scarce experimental evidence 
supporting this notion. 
 
Recent studies have demonstrated that monkeys value information about 
upcoming primary rewards (such as water; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosawa, 2009, 2011). 
They are even willing to forgo some portion of this reward to receive advance 
information about it, despite the information having no influence on the likelihood of 
receiving reward (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015). Further, the same 
dopaminergic neurons that signal changes in the value of the reward also code changes in 
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the value of information, suggesting that information and primary rewards share 
behavioral and neurobiological properties. Research in humans further supports this idea, 
demonstrating that people are more willing to wait and pay for information about which 
they’re more curious (Kang et al., 2009) and that high-curiosity information is associated 
with activation in brain areas known to respond to rewards, including the nucleus 
accumbens and the caudate (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009).  
 
There is also a strong link between how valuable information is and the likelihood 
of remembering it. People are more likely to remember high-curiosity information; even 
incidental information presented during a high-curiosity state is better remembered later 
(Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Mullaney, Carpenter, Grotenhuis, & Burianek, 
2014). Such findings dovetail with well-known findings regarding the enhancing effect of 
reward on subsequent memory (e.g., Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & 
Gabrieli, 2006).  
 
These studies support an information-as-reward hypothesis, demonstrating that 
curiosity conforms to basic characteristics of reward-motivated behavior. However, they 
leave open critical questions related to the extent to which this analogy holds true at a 
deeper level. In particular, there are two central features of reward-driven behavior that 
have been extensively characterized, but whose relevance to curiosity remains unknown. 




It is known that rewards and punishments – and gains and losses – have 
differential effects on both behavior and brain (e.g. Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; 
Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Seymour, Daw, 
Dayan, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). Positive vs. negative outcomes also have asymmetric 
effects on information-seeking (Case, Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; Fischer, Jonas, 
Frey, & Kastenmüller, 2008; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller & Shepperd, 2010) and inter-
temporal choice (Berns, Chappelow, Cekic, Zink, Pagnoni, & Martin-Skurski, 2006; 
Hardisty, Appelt, & Weber, 2013; Loewenstein, 2006). People differentially seek positive 
vs. negative information, depending on affect (e.g., Brashers, 2001; Griffin, Dunwoody, 
& Neuwirth, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Yang & Kahlor, 2012). And, they generally 
remember more valenced, as opposed to neutral, information (for a review, see LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006). Moreover, positive valence enhances the effect of reward on memory 
(Wittmann, Schiltz, Boehler, & Düzel, 2008). Thus, valence affects how we seek 
information and how we remember it, suggesting it may affect the value of information 
itself. 
 
A separate literature suggests that gaps in information – “information prediction 
errors” – may be important drivers of curiosity and memory.  Neurobiologically, rewards 
exert their effect through dopaminergic reward prediction errors (Daw & Doya, 2006; 
Schultz, 2006; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). A key finding from computational 
and neurobiological accounts of reward-guided learning is that dopamine neurons in the 
midbrain signal the difference between the expected value of the reward and the value of 
the reward actually received, suggesting that it is the discrepancy between received 
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reward and expected reward that drives learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; for a review, 
see Schultz, 2006). If information operates similarly, information prediction errors may 
play a key role in curiosity and learning. Indeed, a core feature of Loewenstein’s 
information gap theory is that curiosity is partly driven by predictions about the ability of 
information to resolve uncertainty. This idea applies a “reference-point concept” to 
curiosity, suggesting that we are sensitive to both absolute and relative gaps in 
information and arguing that we are more likely to be curious about information if we 
estimate that the probability of that information satisfying our curiosity is high 
(Loewenstein, 1994).   
 
Here, we examined the information-as-reward hypothesis, testing two new 
predictions about the role of valence and information prediction errors in driving 
curiosity and memory. We use willingness to wait, a well-established measure of reward-
motivated behavior (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Because it is 
known that time is valuable, waiting can be used as a measure of the motivational value 
of rewards (e.g., Hayden, Parikh, Deaner, & Platt, 2007). If curiosity reflects the value of 
information, we would expect participants to show greater willingness to wait for more 
valuable information, i.e., information that engendered greater curiosity.  
 
We test two hypotheses: (1) That the valence of information will affect curiosity 
and subsequent learning, specifically that positively and negatively valenced information 
will engender greater curiosity and promote better learning than neutral information. (2) 
That information prediction errors will affect learning. The notion of quantifying 
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curiosity as the anticipation of the value of information and satisfaction as the judged 
value of received information is a new idea, directly motivated by theories and studies in 
systems neuroscience demonstrating that dopaminergic neurons show parallel responses 
to the anticipation and receipt of information. We test the relevance of this framework to 
curiosity, proposing that the difference between the satisfaction experienced upon receipt 
of information and the curiosity experienced in anticipation of information functions as 
an information prediction error. We hypothesize that this information prediction error is 
an important factor in how curiosity drives learning, such that people will better 
remember information associated with more positive prediction errors.  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of 84 individuals participated in this two-day study (mean age = 
20.9 ± 4.9 years; 56 females, 28 males). On the first day, 55 participants received 
research credit for their participation and 29 participants were paid $12/hour. The 
participants who received research credit were then surprised with an offer to participate 
in a follow-up experiment in the lab for payment instead of credit; 43 returned (mean age 
= 21.5 ± 6.4 years; 27 females, 16 males). The participants paid on the first day were told 
from the onset that this was a two-day study, though they were not told the purpose of the 
second session; 26 of these participants returned for the second day (mean age = 20.7 ± 
2.3 years; 18 females, 8 males). On the second day, all participants were paid $12/hour. 
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because they did not complete the 
curiosity and satisfaction-rating portion of the task on the first day, leaving 81 
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participants who participated fully in the first day of the study and 66 participants who 
participated fully in both days of the study.  
 
Determination of sample size. In a previous pilot study (N=38), we ran a simplified 
logistic regression model using the average curiosity rating associated with each question 
as the predictor and found the following result: (e^β0 = 0.07, p<0.001; e^βcuriosity = 2.03, 
p<0.001). Then, using the powerMediation package in R (Qiu, 2015), which calculates 
sample sizes based on the methods outlined in Hsieh, Bloch, and Larsen (1998), we 
calculated that a sample size of 63 would yield of power of 0.8 at alpha level 0.05. This 
study differs somewhat from the current study in that the curiosity ratings were generated 
by a separate group of participants; we, therefore, aimed for a slightly larger sample size 
to ensure adequate power.   
 
Materials. The task was presented on Apple Macintosh computers, using Matlab (Natick, 
MA) software and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) to present stimuli and 
collect responses. Study stimuli comprised general interest trivia questions, culled from 
Internet sources, including www.corsinet.com and www.triviaplaying.com. Examples 
included: “Which poisonous snake smells like fresh cut cucumbers?”; “What comet was 
first sighted by the Chinese in 240 B.C.?”; and “What does ‘SPF’ mean on sunscreen 
containers?” Participants saw 69 trivia questions in the initial trivia task. The same 69 
questions were also used in both the curiosity-rating and subsequent memory components 




Pre-experiment valence ratings. Across three separate trivia studies, we asked 
participants to rate the valence of trivia questions. These participants (N = 102, mean age 
= 22.69 ± 5.96 years; 72 females, 30 males) were shown each trivia question and asked to 
rate how positive or negative they thought each question was on a scale from 1 to 7, with 
1 being “Very Negative,” 4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Very Positive” (Figure 1c). 
We pooled the results of these valence ratings to create average valence ratings for each 
question. We then ordered these questions based on their valence ratings and conducted a 
split of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, corresponding to valence categories of negative (mean = 3.36 ± 
0.32), neutral (mean = 4.10 ± 0.15), and positive (mean = 4.78 ± 0.33). The mean valence 
ratings for each category differed significantly from each other (F(2) = 147.10, p < 0.001; 
pairwise, Bonferroni-corrected t-tests all p < 0.001).   
 
Procedure. First, participants read a brief set of instructions and completed a practice 
round of the trivia task. In the trivia task (Figure 1a), participants were presented with 
each trivia question, along with three possible response choices: Skip, Wait, or Know. 
Participants had eight seconds to read the question and choose their response. They were 
instructed that if they already knew the answer, they should press the Know key. They 
were instructed to press Skip if they did not know the answer but weren’t interested in 
finding out the answer or weren’t willing to wait the amount of time designated by the 
Wait option. After a brief fixation, both the Skip and Know responses were followed 
directly by the next question. Participants were instructed to press the Wait response if 
they did not know the answer and were interested in finding out the answer and willing to 
wait the amount of time designated. The time delays associated with the Wait option 
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varied, in five-second increments, from 10 to 30 seconds. Upon choosing this option, 
participants saw a fixation cross for the duration of the wait time, and then the answer 
appeared. Once they chose to wait, they could not change their choice. Once the answer 
was displayed, participants advanced to the next question by key press. Participants were 
instructed at the outset that the entire experiment would last one hour, regardless of their 
responses.  
 
After the primary trivia task, participants were shown the same 69 questions and 
were asked to rate their curiosity upon first seeing each question, on a scale from one 
(“Not at all curious”) to seven (“Very curious”). They were also asked to rate how 
satisfied they were with the answer, on a scale from one (“Not at all satisfied”) to seven 
(“Very satisfied”) (Figure 1d).  
 
Participants returned approximately one week (mean = 7.2 ± 1.8 days) after their 
initial sessions. During this follow-up session, participants saw the list of questions 







Fig. 1.  
Experimental paradigm for testing the relationship between curiosity and willingness to 
wait for information. (a) In the primary task participants were shown a trivia question and three 
possible response choices. If participants chose Skip or Know, they automatically advanced to the 
next question. If they chose Wait, they had to wait the designated amount of time, and then the 
answer was displayed. After completion of the primary trivia task, participants were asked to 
generate curiosity ratings (b), rating each question on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being “Not at all 
curious” and 7 being “Very curious,” and satisfaction ratings (d), rating each answer on a scale 
from 1-7 with 1 being “Not at all satisfied” and 7 being “Very satisfied.” Participants in separate 
studies were shown these same questions and asked to generate valence ratings (c), again on a 




Analyses. All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2013), and mixed effects 
logistic regression analyses were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & 
Bolker, 2013). All Know trials were excluded from the analyses. Each trial for each 
participant was entered in as a separate data point, and mixed effects logistic regression 
models were run on the entire dataset, with intercepts varying by participant, with trivia 
question as a random effect, and with other variables, including curiosity and delay time, 
included as both fixed and random effects. The exponential beta coefficients are reported 
for each model to allow for easier interpretation of each variable’s effect.   
 
Valence  
First, we evaluated whether participants’ choices to wait were informed by their 
curiosity and the valence of the question, running a mixed effects logistic regression 
analysis with the intercept varying randomly by participant, the trivia item as a random 
effect, and with the valence category and individual curiosity ratings associated with each 
question as both fixed and random effects.  
 
To analyze effects of memory, we excluded all Skip and Know trials, so that we 
only examined participants’ memory for answers they chose to wait for. This eliminated 
one participant who did not wait for any answers, leaving 65 participants. We tested 
whether the valence of the information affected the likelihood of remembering it, running 
a mixed effects logistic regression analysis with the intercept varying randomly by 
participant, the trivia item as a random effect, and with the individual curiosity ratings 
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and prior valence category associated with each question as both fixed and random 
effects. 
 
Information Prediction Error 
For each question, we had the participant’s rating of curiosity about question and 
satisfaction with the answer. First, we calculated the correlation between participants’ 
ratings of curiosity and satisfaction. Then, using these curiosity and satisfaction values, 
we calculated an “information prediction error,” subtracting the difference between the 
actual value of the information received (satisfaction) and the anticipated value of the 
information (curiosity). For example, if a participant rated a question as a 4 in curiosity 
but as a 6 in satisfaction, we considered that an information prediction error of +2; if she 
rated a question as a 4 in curiosity but the answer as a 2 in satisfaction, we considered 
that an information prediction error of -2. We then calculated each participant’s average 
information prediction error and the overall average information prediction error to 
determine the extent to which curiosity was satisfied across participants and trials. We 
then ran a mixed effects logistic regression model, with intercept varying by participant, 
trivia question as a random effect, and curiosity and information prediction error as both 




Participants’ choices to wait were informed by their curiosity, as well as the positive 
valence of the question and the wait time associated with that trial (e^β0 = 0.04, p<0.001; 
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e^βcuriosity = 4.93, p<0.001; e^βwait time = 0.88, p<0.001; e^βnegative = 1.02, p=0.88; e^βpositive 
= 1.31, p<0.01; Figure 2), such that participants were more likely to wait for information 
they were more curiosity about, less likely to wait for information associated with a 
longer delay, and more likely to wait for positive, as compared to neutral, information.  
 
Fig. 2.  
Participants were more likely to wait for more positive information. (a) To display the effects 
of curiosity and valence on waiting behavior, for graphing purposes, a pared-down model was run 
separately for questions in each valence category (negative, neutral, positive). (b) Raw proportion 
of waiting was calculated (the number of trials for which an individual chose to wait in each 
valence category divided by the total number of trials they chose to wait). The graph displays the 
mean proportions of waiting; error bars represent the standard errors of the mean.  
 
Participants on average remembered 74.9 percent of answers correctly (range: 
36.4 – 97.4 percent). Participants’ likelihood of remembering the answers correctly was 
predicted by their initial curiosity about the question and the positive valence rating 
associated with the question (e^β0 = 0.09, p<0.001; e^βcuriosity = 1.79, p<0.001; e^βnegative = 
1.10, p=0.35; e^βpositive = 1.36, p<0.01; Figure 3), such that people were more likely to 
remember more positive information and information about which they were more 
curious.  




















































Fig. 3.  
Participants were more likely to remember more positive information. (a) To display the 
effects of curiosity and valence on subsequent memory, for graphing purposes, a pared-down 
model was run separately for questions in each valence category (negative, neutral, positive).  
(b) Raw proportion of correct responses was calculated (the number of trials for which an 
individual correctly remembered the answer in each valence category divided by the total number 
of answers they correctly remembered). The graph displays the mean proportions of correct 
answers; error bars represent the standard errors of the mean.   
 
 
Information Prediction Error 
On questions for which participants waited for the answers, curiosity and 
satisfaction were positively related (r = 0.57). The mean IPE across all trials and all 
subjects was negative (-0.29); however, there was considerable variability across 
participants, with mean individual IPEs ranging from -2.81 to 1.31. Examining IPEs for 
low (rated 1-3) vs. high (rated 5-7) curiosity items, we found that the average IPE for 
low-curiosity items was 0.67, while the average IPE for high curiosity items was -0.59.  
 
Participants’ likelihood of remembering an answer correctly was predicted by 
their curiosity about the question and the information prediction error associated with that 
trial (e^β0 = 1.03, p>0.05; e^βcuriosity = 1.26, p<0.001; e^βIPE  = 1.19, p< 0.001; Figure 4), 
such that people were more likely to remember information for which there was a more 
























































positive prediction error, i.e., information for which satisfaction was greater than 
curiosity.  
 
Fig. 4.  
More positive information prediction errors (IPE) predicted greater likelihood of 
remembering the answer correctly. (a) For graphing purposes, a pared-down model was run to 
depict the mean likelihood of remembering the answer, as a factor of information prediction error 
(IPE). (b) To further illustrate the differences based on IPEs, IPEs were grouped into three 
categories (negative IPE, 0 IPE, and positive IPE), and the proportion of correctly remembered 
information was calculated in each IPE category for each individual. The graph displays the mean 




We found that information – even trivial information – can function as a reward, 
guiding choices and learning in predictable ways. First, we found that the valence of 
information affects its reward value, with people more willing to wait for more positive, 
compared to neutral information. Moreover, this valence effect extended to memory, with 
a greater likelihood of remembering more positive information. Second, we found that 
memory was better when there was a positive prediction error, i.e., when the reward 
value upon receipt was greater than the anticipated reward value.   
 

















































The importance of valence in these studies is particularly interesting given that it 
is critical to learning. Recent studies have offered some important insights into the 
mechanisms underlying biases toward positive information and different tendencies to 
learn from positive vs. negative information (Frank et al., 2004; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, 
Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012). The effects of valence on curiosity also raise 
questions about the possible role of emotion. Indeed, emotion may even serve as another 
form of information (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz, 2011). Although we did not 
directly measure emotion in this experiment, existing data provide a possible framework. 
In particular, taking a dimensional approach to emotion (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 
1998; Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russell, 1980), we might think of an 
individual’s curiosity as reflecting arousal state. Prior evidence suggests that pupil 
dilation, a common measure of emotional arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 
2008), is greater in states of higher curiosity (Kang et al., 2009). Of course, compared to 
the types of stimuli typically used in experiments examining the effect of emotion on 
information seeking and memory, this information was relatively weak in arousal and 
valence. Still, our results regarding valence suggest useful tools for future work to more 
directly investigate the role of emotion in curiosity.  
 
Curiosity can be difficult to define and is often conflated with other similar 
concepts, including interest (Grossnickle, 2014). We operationalized curiosity as the 
anticipation of reward, where the reward is information. Similarly, information can come 
in many forms and have a variety of uses, many of which might contribute to its reward 
value and valence. Here, we focused on trivia, as it offers a rich, multi-dimensional 
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stimulus set, which has been used previously to examine curiosity (e.g., Gruber et al., 
2014; Kang et al., 2009; Mullaney et al., 2014). One interesting feature of trivia is that it 
is information that, by definition, has no real utility, and thus provides a conservative test 
of the information-as-reward hypothesis. Future work will determine to what extent our 
effects, and those by others (e.g., Kang et al., 2009), generalize to other forms of 
information. 
 
Prior literature has focused primarily on the anticipation associated with curiosity; 
here we additionally examine the importance of satisfaction. Given that Loewenstein 
(1994) postulates that a core feature of curiosity is its tendency to leave the curious 
person unsatisfied, it is important to examine what happens when curiosity is satisfied 
and how satisfaction predicts subsequent learning. We find that curiosity is often satisfied 
and that the disparity between the anticipated vs. received reward predicts later memory. 
This finding is consistent with recent animal studies of dopamine neurons (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2011), suggesting that it may be important to consider both the value 
of information and of reward itself in reinforcement learning models (Oudeyer, Kaplan, 
& Hafner, 2007; Yamamoto & Ishikawa, 2010).  
 
Understanding curiosity could have important implications for educational 
interventions and learning strategies for children in the classroom. It could also have 
implications for psychiatric and neurological disorders, particularly those that implicate 
dopaminergic systems, such as schizophrenia and Parkinson’s disease. These disorders 
often list deficiencies in reward processing among their symptoms. It would, thus, be 
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instructive to learn whether such deficits extend to information, and, therefore, whether 










































Curiosity and aging:  
Enhanced curiosity and a positivity bias among older adults 
 
Introduction 
“[O]utside of their own business, the ideas gained by men before they are twenty-
five are practically the only ideas they shall have in their lives. They cannot get 
anything new. Disinterested curiosity is past, the mental grooves and channels set, 
the power of assimilation gone” (James, 1893, p. 402). 
 
 
  William James had a bleak view of curiosity in older adulthood, but there is 
limited experimental evidence to support this outlook. Prior studies of curiosity and aging 
have relied primarily on self-report, and while some studies have found evidence for age-
related decline on somewhat related constructs, such as novelty-seeking and openness 
(Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006), those that have 
examined curiosity specifically have found no age-related differences (Camp, Rodrigue, 
& Olson, 1984; Giambra, Camp, & Grodsky, 1992; Stoner & Spencer, 1986). One study 
used exploratory eye movements as a proxy for curiosity and found no differences 
between healthy older adults and younger adults (Daffner, Scinto, Weintraub, Guinessey, 
& Mesulam, 1994). Apart from that, to our knowledge, few behavioral studies of 
curiosity and aging exist.  
 
Our previous research suggests that one way to examine curiosity is to evaluate 
the extent to which information functions as a reward (Marvin & Shohamy, in press). 
This research draws on behavioral economics literature which suggests that people are 
more willing to wait for rewards they value more highly and, therefore, uses willingness 
to wait as a measure of the subjective value of information. This information-as-reward 
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hypothesis further suggests the involvement of the dopaminergic reward system. Indeed, 
our conceptualization of curiosity as the anticipation of reward – where the reward is 
information – suggests the possibility of age-related decrements in curiosity, as there is 
evidence of reduced neural activity among older adults in reward-responsive areas of the 
midbrain in the anticipation of monetary rewards (Dreher, Meyer-Lindenberg, Kohn, & 
Berman, 2008; Mell, Wartenburger, Marschner, Villringer, Reischies, & Heekeren, 2009; 
Schott, Niehaus, Wittmann, Schütze, Seidenbecher, Heinze, & Düzel, 2007). However, 
other evidence suggests that these age-related differences might be limited to loss 
anticipation and may be related to a positivity bias among older adults, as discussed 
below (Samanez-Larkin, Gibbs, Khanna, Nielsen, Carstensen, & Knutson, 2007). 
 
Additionally, it is not clear that such age-related decrements in dopaminergic 
functioning would affect curiosity, particularly as measured by our willingness-to-wait 
task. There is some evidence to suggest that older adults are not globally impaired on 
reward-mediated tasks but rather that they demonstrate specific performance deficits 
when anticipating reward outcomes that are probabilistic or ambiguous (for reviews, see 
Hammerer & Eppinger, 2012; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015), neither of which is the 
case here. Further, research suggests that older adults show intact and potentially even 
less biased economic decision-making (Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott, & Allman, 
2005). Studies examining age effects on inter-temporal choice tasks, of which our task is 
a variant, have resulted in conflicting findings, with studies showing evidence of more 
impulsive choices, less impulsive choices, or no differences at all in older, relative to 
younger, adults (for a review, see Lim & Yu, 2015).  
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 Our previous research further suggests an important role for the valence of 
information in curiosity, with younger adults showing greater likelihood of remembering 
more positive, relative to neutral information. This finding is of particular interest with 
regard to aging, given the robust research suggesting a positivity bias among older adults 
(Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Older adults report fewer negative affective experiences 
(Carstensen et al., 2011; Carstensen et al., 2000; Charles, et al., 2001; Mroczek & Kolarz, 
1998) and they are less likely to attend to and remember more negative stimuli 
(Carstensen, 2006). In monetary decision-making tasks, relative to younger adults, older 
adults show less negative affect in anticipation of losses but similar levels of positive 
affect in anticipation of gains (Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008; Samanez-Larkin et 
al., 2007) and they are able to use their experience and acquired knowledge to make 
sound financial decisions (Li, Gao, Zeynep Enkavi, Zaval, Weber, & Johnson, 2015; 
Zaval, Li, Johnson, & Weber, 2015).  
 
Indeed, Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST: Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999) posits that as people age, the notion of having more limited time becomes 
more salient, compelling a change in motivational focus, such that older adults tend to 
prioritize emotionally meaningful experiences and make choices to maximize positive 
affective experience. Socioemotional Selectivity Theory suggests that if time does not 
seem limited, people are more likely to set goals that emphasize preparation, information 
gathering, novelty seeking, and exploration. However, if time seems more limited, people 
are more likely to be motivated to improve their current well being, typically through 
emotion regulation. Thus, SST predicts that older adults will engage in less information-
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seeking generally. And, indeed, in the context of healthcare decisions, consumer choices, 
and risky decision-making tasks, older adults tend to seek less information before making 
decisions (for reviews, see: Mata & Nunes, 2010). However, these age-related differences 
in information seeking appear to be modulated by valence, such that diminished 
information seeking is more often seen among older adults in contexts that emphasize the 
negative aspects of choices (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Mather, Knight, & 
McCaffrey, 2005). When given choices between options, younger adults tend to review 
more negative information before making decisions, while older adults tend to review 
more positive information (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that the diminished information seeking sometimes seen in older adults 
may be restricted to situations involve negative information.  
 
 In the following study, we assess curiosity in older and younger adults, using 
participants’ willingness to wait for information as an indicator of the anticipated value of 
that information. Despite age-related decrements in dopaminergic functioning, based on 
the limited scope of functions affected by these decrements and based on previous 
findings of no age-related deficits in curiosity based on self-reports, we hypothesize that  
older adults, we hypothesize that, relative to younger adults, older adults will show an 
enhanced likelihood to wait for positive information and a decreased likelihood to wait 







Participants. A total of 57 older adults and 54 younger adults were recruited to 
participate in this study. Older adults were recruited from the community surrounding 
Columbia University and were paid $12/hour for their participation. Younger adults were 
recruited from the Columbia undergraduate population and received research credit for 
their participation. A total of 11 older participants and 8 younger participants were 
excluded from the analysis because they did not complete the curiosity-rating portion of 
the task on the first day, experienced some computer malfunction during the task, and/or 
failed to follow task instructions, leaving a total of 46 older participants (mean age = 
64.17 ± 10.19 years; 34 females, 12 males) and 46 younger participants (mean age = 
20.58 ± 2.51 years; 31 females, 15 males).  
 
Materials. The task stimuli were 70 general interest trivia questions, culled from Internet 
sources and from Ken Jenning’s Trivia Almanac: 8,888 Questions in 365 Days (Jennings, 
2008). Stimuli included such trivia questions as: “What proper name is spelled unusually, 
with a single n, both on the Liberty Bell and in the U.S. Constitution?” “What are divided 
by Bott’s dots?” and “What organ was the first to be successfully transplanted?” 
 
Pre-experiment valence ratings. Across three separate trivia studies, we asked 
participants to rate the valence of trivia questions. These participants (N = 102, mean age 
= 22.69 ± 5.96 years; 72 females, 30 males) were shown each trivia question and asked to 
rate how positive or negative they thought each question was on a scale from 1 to 7, with 
1 being “Very Negative,” 4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Very Positive” (Figure 2.1c). 
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We pooled the results of these valence ratings to create average valence ratings for each 
question. We then ranked ordered these questions based on their valence ratings and 
conducted a split of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, corresponding to valence categories of negative (mean 
= 3.36 ± 0.32), neutral (mean = 4.10 ± 0.15), and positive (mean = 4.78 ± 0.33). The 
mean valence ratings for each category differed significantly from each other (F(2) = 




  Participants were asked to read a brief set of instructions and to complete a 
practice version and then the actual version of the curiosity task (Figure 2.1a). In this 
task, participants were presented with a trivia question and three possible response 
choices: Skip, Wait, or Know. Participants were instructed that if they knew the answer 
to the trivia question, they should press the key corresponding to Know. They were 
instructed to press the key corresponding to Skip if they did not know the answer and 
were not willing to wait to receive the answer. Participants were instructed to select the 
key corresponding to the Wait response if they did not know the answer to the question 
and were curious enough to wait for the designated delay time. The time delays 
associated with the Wait option were presented along with the question and varied in 5-
second increments from 10 to 30 seconds. Participants were given eight seconds to read 




  If participants chose Skip or Know, they were shown a brief fixation cross and 
then automatically advanced to the next question. If participants chose Wait, they saw a 
fixation cross for the duration of the wait time, and then the answer appeared. Upon 
choosing Wait, they could not then change their choice on that trial. Once the answer was 
displayed, participants could advance to the next question by key press. Participants were 
instructed at the outset that the entire experiment would last one hour, regardless of their 
decisions to wait.  
 
Curiosity-rating Task 
  Upon completion of this task, participants were offered a break and then were 
shown the same 70 trivia questions they’d seen previously. For each trivia 
question/answer pair, they were asked to rate their curiosity upon seeing each question. 
Ratings were made on a 7-point scale with 1 being “Not at all curious” and 7 being “Very 







Fig. 2.1  
Experimental paradigm for testing the relationship between curiosity and willingness to 
wait for information. (a) In the primary task participants were shown a trivia question and three 
possible response choices. If participants chose Skip or Know, they automatically advanced to the 
next question. If they chose Wait, they had to wait the designated amount of time, and then the 
answer was displayed. After completion of the primary trivia task, participants were asked to 
generate curiosity ratings (b), rating each question on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being “Not at all 
curious” and 7 being “Very curious.” Participants in separate studies were shown these same 
questions and asked to generate valence ratings (c), again on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being “Very 
negative,” 4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Very positive.” 
 
Analyses. All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2013), and mixed effects 
logistic regression analyses were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & 
Bolker, 2013). All Know trials were excluded from the analyses, as we were interested 
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only in participants’ decisions to skip or wait. Analyses were run such that each trial for 
each participant was entered in as a separate data point, and mixed effects logistic 
regression models were run on the entire data set, with intercepts varying by participant, 
with trivia question as a random effect, and with other variables, including curiosity and 
delay time, included as both fixed and random effects. The exponential beta coefficients 
are reported for each model to allow for easier interpretation of each variable’s effect.   
 
First, we compared mean ratings of curiosity between older and younger 
participants, calculating each individual’s mean curiosity rating and comparing the group 
means using a t-test with Welch’s correction for unequal variances. We then sought to 
compare the mean proportion of choices to wait between older and younger adults. 
Again, we calculated each individual’s proportion of choices to wait and compared the 
group means using a t-test with Welch’s correction.  
 
To evaluate choices to wait based on curiosity and age, we ran a mixed effects 
logistic regression model with intercepts varying by participant, with trivia question as a 
random effect, with age group (older vs. younger) as a fixed effect, and with individual 
curiosity rating and wait time associated with the trial as both fixed and random effects.  
 
Turning to valence, we first calculated the mean proportion of choices to wait for 
information in each valence category for each participant. We then ran a 2x3 ANOVA to 
examine effects of age category (older vs. younger) and valence category (negative, 
neutral, positive) on decisions to wait. Then, to examine whether the positivity bias was 
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more pronounced in older, compared to younger, adults, we conducted t-tests using 
Welch’s correction to assess whether older adults waited for more positive information 
and less negative information, compared to younger adults.  
 
Then, to evaluate whether participants’ choices to wait were informed by their age 
group, their curiosity, and the valence of the question, we ran a mixed effects logistic 
regression analysis with the intercept varying randomly by participant, the trivia item as a 
random effect, age group as a fixed effect, and with the valence category and individual 
curiosity ratings associated with each question as both random and fixed effects. 
 
Results 
Curiosity and Waiting Behavior 
On average, older participants gave higher ratings of curiosity (t(86) = 4.58, p < 0.001; 
Figure 2.2a) and showed greater willingness to wait for information (t(80) = 4.06, p < 









Mean curiosity ratings and mean tendencies to wait were higher among older adults than 
younger adults. (a) Mean curiosity ratings for younger and older adults. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means (SEMs). (b) Mean proportion of choices to wait for younger and 
older adults. Error bars represent SEMs.  
 
Decisions to wait were predicted by individuals’ curiosity, the delay time 
associated with the question, and whether participants were older or younger (e^β0 = 0.27, 
p<0.01; e^βcuriosity = 4.95, p<0.001; e^βwait time = 0.87, p<0.001; e^βyounger = 0.26, p=0.03; 
Figure 2.3a), such that people were more likely to wait for information about which they 
reported higher curiosity and for which there were shorter delays, and older adults were 
generally more likely to wait for information. Across different delay periods, a similar 
pattern emerges, though there are some differences in choices to wait in both groups that 



















































Older adults more likely to wait for information than younger adults. (a) To display the 
effects of curiosity and age group on waiting behavior, for graphing purposes, a pared-down 
model was run separately for older and younger adults. (b) To display the effects of curiosity and 
time on waiting behavior, a pared-down model was run separately for questions associated with 






































































































Turning to valence, a 2x3 ANOVA revealed main effects of age category (F(1) = 
52.76, p < 0.001) and valence category (F(2) = 6.72, p = 0.001) but no evidence of a 
significant interaction between the two (F = 0.63, p = 0.63; Figure 2.4) on choices to 
wait, such that there were larger proportions of choices to wait among older adults (p < 
0.001) and larger proportions of choices to wait for positive, relative to neutral, 
information (p = 0.003). We ran two additional tests targeted to address our a priori 
hypotheses that older adults would wait for more positive information, compared to 
younger adults and that older adults would wait for less negative information, compared 
to younger adults. We found that older adults waited for more information, regardless of 
valence category, so that although they waited for significantly more positive information 
(t(87) = 5.28, p < 0.001), they also waited for significantly more negative information 






More choices to wait for positive information in both age groups. The graph displays the 
group means for proportions of choices to wait for information in each valence category. Error 
bars represent the standard errors of the mean (SEM).  
 
Decisions to wait were predicted by individuals’ curiosity, the valence of the 
information, and whether participants were older or younger (e^β0 = 0.02, p<0.001; 
e^βcuriosity = 4.36, p<0.001; e^βyounger = 0.33, p = 0.04; e^βnegative = 1.17, p = 0.23; e^βpositive 
= 1.57, p = 0.001; Figure 2.5), such that, again, participants were more likely to wait for 
higher curiosity information and older adults were more likely to wait for information, 
and participants were more likely to wait for positive, relative to neutral, information.  




























Older and younger participants were more likely to wait for more positive information. To 
display the effects of curiosity and valence on waiting behavior in older and younger participants, 
for graphing purposes, a pared-down model was run separately for questions in each valence 
category (negative, neutral, positive) in each age group.  
 
Discussion 
These findings suggest that, contrary to James’s view, curiosity is actually 
enhanced in aging. Older participants in this study gave higher subjective ratings of 
curiosity and showed greater willingness to wait for information. Previous studies 
examining curiosity and aging using self-report measures have revealed no age-related 
decrements in curiosity (Camp et al., 1984; Stoner & Spencer, 1986). Here, we use a 
novel behavioral measure of curiosity and not only show no decrements but, rather, 
enhanced curiosity in aging. This study also replicated our previous findings of an 
asymmetric effect of valence on curiosity, such that both younger and older participants 
were more likely to wait for more positive information.  



























It is important to note, however, that our task measures epistemic curiosity, a 
desire for information. Other studies have noted age-related decrements in other domains 
that are closely related to, but distinct from, epistemic curiosity. For example, previous 
studies have suggested diminished sensation seeking but preserved information seeking 
with age (Giambra et al., 1992). Other studies have also found evidence for reduced 
tendencies towards exploration among older adults (Chin, Payne, Battles, Fu, Morrow, & 
Stine-Morrow, 2012; Mata, Wilke, & Czienskowski, 2009, 2013; Louâpre, van Alphen, 
& Pierre, 2010). These age-related decrements in exploration and sensation seeking are 
particularly interesting to note in light of age-related changes in dopaminergic 
functioning in the brain. Indeed, the Novelty-related Motivation of Anticipation and 
Exploration by Dopamine (NOMAD; Düzel, Bunzeck, Guitart-Masip, & Düzel, 2010) 
model suggests that dopaminergic activity in areas such as the ventral striatum and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex underlies exploration and novelty-seeking and that, given 
age-related declines in dopaminergic functioning, aging might be associated with 
decrements in these behaviors. That said, while the connection to age-related alterations 
in dopaminergic functioning is potentially compelling, it is also important to note that 
reduced exploration in older age may reflect an adaptive behavioral shift over the course 
of the lifetime: youthful tendencies toward exploration help us accumulate knowledge 
which can then be exploited in older adulthood (Carstensen, 2006). 
 
 The results of the current study could similarly be viewed through the lens of 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST). It may be that older and younger participants 
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had different goals in this study. Previous research has found that learning new trivia 
brings pleasure (Perlovsky, Bonniot-Cabanac, & Cabanac, 2010). As SST would predict, 
older adults in this study may have been motivated by a desire to have a more positive 
affective experience and may have thus sought this trivial information because it brought 
pleasure (see Appendix for a discussion of factors potentially associated with curiosity). 
In other words, the enhanced emotional self-regulation ability predicted by SST might 
explain why older participants demonstrated heightened information seeking in this 
context.  
 
As expected, we found evidence for a positivity bias (Mather & Carstensen, 2005) 
in curiosity, which supports and extends previous findings regarding enhanced attention 
to and processing of positive stimuli with aging (for a review, see Murphy & Isaacowitz, 
2008). This asymmetric effect of valence might also help explain why other studies have 
found diminished information-seeking among older adults in potentially more negative 
contexts, such as those involving healthcare-related decisions (Beisecker, 1988; Johnson, 
1990; Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995; Zwahr, Park, & Shifren, 1999). 
 
Although we did not assess age differences in memory in this study, future studies 
might include a memory component, as valence also plays an important role in age 
differences in memory. While older adults tend to show poorer memory than younger 
adults overall, age differences are most pronounced for negative stimuli and 
comparatively small for positive stimuli (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Knight, 
Maines, & Robinson, 2002). Examining the role of aging in curiosity and memory would 
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also be important in the context of reward-motivated learning. The enhancing effects of 
reward on memory appear intact in aging. When stimuli to be remembered are associated 
with different levels of reward, older adults tend to remember fewer stimuli overall but 
they are able to selectively remember stimuli associated with higher reward values 
(Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007; Castel, Humphreys, Lee, Galván, Balota, & McCabe, 2011; 
Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2014). For example, when given lists of words to remember, 
with each word associated with different reward values, both older and younger adults 
allocate their study time such that they focus on learning the higher-value rewards 
(Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGillivray, & Link, 2013). Older adults demonstrate 
such an emphasis on studying higher-value words – allocating their study time to focus 
primarily on these words at the expense of lower-value words – that although they tend to 
remember fewer words overall than the younger adults, there are no age differences in 
memory for higher-value rewards (Castel et al., 2011; Castel, Murayama, Friedman, 
McGillivray, & Link, 2013). Thus, we might expect that older adults would show poorer 
memory than younger adults for lower-value but not for higher-value information.  
 
Our previous research has demonstrated an important role for information 
prediction errors (IPEs) in memory. In future studies, it would be instructive to examine 
the extent to which these IPE effects extend to aging. There is some evidence to suggest 
poorer updating of reward prediction errors among older adults, with older adults 
showing reduced activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and the nucleus accumbens 
associated with reward prediction errors (Eppinger, Schuck, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013; 
Samanez-Larkin, Worthy, Mata, McClure, & Knutson, 2014) and with pharmacological 
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manipulations to increase dopaminergic activity seeming to improve learning 
performance and enhance reward-prediction-error-related activity in the nucleus 
accumbens (Chowdhury, Guitart-Masip, Lambert, Dayan, Huys, Düzel, & Dolan, 2013). 
However, these studies have used probabilistic reward learning tasks that required 
flexibility and updating. Tasks that do not require flexibly learning from feedback show 
no such age-related differences in behavioral performance and neural activity (Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2014), suggesting that age-related deficits are not in assigning value to 
anticipated rewards but in flexibly updating value in response to feedback.  
 
Given that our task shares many aspects in common with standard inter-temporal 
choice tasks, it is important to examine these age-related differences in the context of 
other findings using more standard tasks. There is some evidence to suggest that older 
adults are less prone to steep delay-related discounting of rewards (Löckenhoff, 2011). 
Interestingly, discounting behavior in older adults may reflect a positivity bias, with older 
adults showing less likelihood of discounting future gains than younger adults but no age 
differences in discounting future losses (Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue, & Dunning, 2011). 
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated greater activity in the ventral striatum when 
choosing smaller, more immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards in younger 
adults but no such differences in activity in older adults, suggesting that older adults do 
not experience the same reductions in reward-related activity when rewards are 
associated with delays (Eppinger, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2012; Samanez-Larkin, Mata, 
Radu, Ballard, Carstensen, & McClure, 2011). However, overall, findings related to age 
effects on inter-temporal choice are still somewhat conflicting, which may be a result of a 
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variety of factors related to the specifics of the task and to individual differences in the 
participants (for a discussion, see Lim & Yu, 2015).  
 
Indeed, the role of individual differences in performance on inter-temporal and 
related tasks should be noted. Halfmann and colleagues (2015) found evidence of large 
individual differences among older adults, with poorer decision-making associated with 
decreased activity in brain areas important for processing the value of rewards, including 
the striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. There is also some evidence to 
suggest differential sensitivities to reward in older-old, relative to younger-old adults 
(Frank & Kong, 2008). With larger samples, it would be interesting to track performance 
across the lifespan. In fact, there are some reports that patient choices on inter-temporal 
choice tasks peak during middle age (Read & Read, 2004).  
 
Finally, in this study we used reward-motivated behavior as a lens through which 
to examine curiosity, but our findings here may suggest another way to explore reward-
related behavior in aging. There is evidence to suggest that some of the typically used 
reward-related tasks play to younger people’s strengths and do not test aspects of reward-
related behavior that are actually enhanced with age (Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 
2010). In other words, some prior work on age-related effects on decision-making and 
reward processing suggest age-related deficits, which might better be characterized as 
age-related differences. For example, a recent study found that while younger adults 
performed better on a task requiring “model-free” decision-making – i.e., decision-
making that requires in-the-moment processing of a reward-outcome contingency, 
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independent of previous choices – older adults outperformed younger adults on a task 
that required more “model-based” decision-making, i.e., one in which outcomes were 
dependent upon previous choices and the overall structure of the task had to be learned 
holistically (Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011). Furthermore, 
previous work has suggested age-related changes in motivation, such that older adults 
tend to allocate cognitive resources more selectively and are more likely to engage in 
tasks they judge to be more self-relevant (for a review, see Hess, 2014). Thus, it may be 
that reward-motivated behavior in older adults is at least in part dependent on the nature 
of the reward itself. Most prior studies have used monetary rewards, but there is evidence 
to suggest different valuations of such rewards between older and younger adults and 
greater importance assigned to more social-emotional rewards in older adulthood 
(Carstensen et al., 1999). Thus, while reward-motivated behavior might be a useful lens 
through which to study curiosity and information seeking, curiosity and information 





















Curiosity and Parkinson’s disease:  
Reduced reward anticipation and willingness to wait for lower-value rewards 
Introduction 
Curiosity is a key driver of learning (Berlyne, 1960) and has been linked to 
positive physical and mental health outcomes and greater quality of life (Kashdan & 
Steger, 2007; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Swan & Carmelli, 1996). Yet, despite its 
importance, curiosity has received relatively little research attention. Recent studies have 
begun to address this gap, examining curiosity through the lens of the dopaminergic 
reward system (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Bromberg-Martin & 
Hikosaka, 2011; Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009). Behavioral 
data provide evidence that information can serve as a reward, motivating humans and 
monkeys to sacrifice time, tokens, and even primary reinforcers, such as water, to obtain 
it (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & 
Shohamy, under review). Neurobiological data demonstrate increased activation in key 
areas of the dopaminergic reward system during high curiosity states (Blanchard et al., 
2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011; Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang 
et al., 2009).  
 
  Our previous research is further suggestive of a role for the dopaminergic reward 
system in curiosity (Marvin & Shohamy, under review). This work incorporates 
Loewenstein’s information gap theory of curiosity, which suggests that curiosity is 
spurred in part by predictions about the ability of a piece of information to satisfy 
curiosity. It further draws on neurobiological and computational accounts of reward 
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learning, which suggest that the discrepancy between received reward and expected 
reward drives learning and that this discrepancy is coded by dopamine neurons in the 
midbrain. In our work, we conceptualize curiosity as the anticipation of an information 
reward, satisfaction as the actual reward outcome, and the information prediction error as 
the difference between these values. Analogous to the findings regarding reward 
prediction errors for more conventional rewards, we find that these information 
prediction errors are important factors in learning.  
 
  Altogether, there is some evidence to suggest a role for the striatum and its 
dopaminergic inputs in information seeking, curiosity, and satisfaction. However, so far 
these studies have been correlational. Thus, it remains unknown whether striatal function 
plays a necessary and causal role in curiosity. One way to address this question is to 
examine curiosity in humans with disrupted striatal function. Parkinson’s disease (PD) is 
a progressive neurological disorder characterized by dopamine depletion in the striatum 
leading to striatal dysfunction (Dauer & Przedborski, 2003). While it was once thought 
that symptoms were primarily motor-related, there is now extensive evidence that 
Parkinson’s disease affects various aspects of motivation and cognition, including reward 
processing and learning (e.g., Czernecki, Pillon, Houeto, Pochon, Levy, & Dubois, 2002; 
Rowe et al., 2008). Indeed, greater dopaminergic cell loss in PD is associated with poorer 
reward processing (Aarts, Helmich, Janssen, Oyen, Bloem, & Cools, 2012). An important 
question is whether these deficits extend to information and, therefore, how curiosity and 




Given that we conceptualize of curiosity as reflecting the anticipated value of 
reward and satisfaction as reflecting the value of the actual reward outcome, it is 
important to disentangle the extent to which Parkinson’s disease contributes to deficits in 
reward anticipation or in responsiveness to reward outcome. While there is some 
evidence for aberrant neural activity in response to reward outcomes among patients with 
PD (e.g., Kunig, Leenders, Martin-Soelch, Missimer, Magyar, & Schultz, 2001), it is not 
clear that these findings are able to dissociate reward anticipation from reward outcome. 
There seems to be wider agreement across studies that PD is associated with deficits in 
reward anticipation (Keitz, Koerts, Kortekaas, Renken, de Jong, & Leenders, 2008; 
Mattox, Valle-Inclán, & Hackley, 2006; Rowe et al., 2008). For example, Schott and 
colleagues (2007) found that healthy older adults and adults with PD showed less 
activation in the ventral striatum than healthy younger adults in the anticipation of 
upcoming rewards; older adults and adults with PD instead showed greater activation 
upon actual receipt of the rewards. Thus, while younger adults showed the predicted 
spike in ventral striatal activity upon seeing a cue predicting upcoming reward and then 
no such spike in activity upon seeing the reward itself, older adults and adults with PD 
showed the opposite pattern, suggestive of deficits in reward anticipation. Thus, if 
information serves as a reward and if curiosity reflects the anticipation of information, we 
might expect to see deficits in curiosity in people with Parkinson’s disease. In contrast, if 
Parkinson’s disease is not strongly associated with deficits in the actual valuation of 
reward outcomes, then we might expect to see no differences in satisfaction, our measure 




 Regarding memory, the hypotheses are less clear. Dopamine helps to signal 
motivational salience and can enhance the formation of episodic memories (Shohamy & 
Adcock, 2010). While previous research suggests that people with Parkinson’s disease 
show deficits in non-declarative memory, thought to be mediated by the basal ganglia 
(for a review, see Foerde & Shohamy, 2011a), research in our laboratory and elsewhere 
has demonstrated that while striatal-based memory may be compromised, hippocampal-
based memory remains mostly intact in people with Parkinson’s disease (Foerde & 
Shohamy, 2011b). Given that this task requires declarative memory, we hypothesized that 
there would not be a strong effect of Parkinson’s disease on memory.  
 
  People with Parkinson’s disease are commonly treated with dopamine 
replacement therapy, including the dopamine precursor levodopa (L-DOPA) and other 
dopaminergic agonists (Hornykiewicz, 1974). These medications improve motor 
symptoms but exert more complex effects on cognitive performance, leading to 
improvements and decrements, depending on the nature of the task (for a review, see 
Cools, 2006). Thus, an additional question is how acute effects of medication might 
affect curiosity and waiting behavior. In the following study, we describe a group of 
participants with PD, about half of whom were randomly assigned to be tested while they 
were ON medication and about half of whom were randomly assigned to be tested while 
they were OFF medication.  
 
  In this study, we examine curiosity, as measured by self-report ratings and by 
willingness to wait for information, among participants with Parkinson’s disease and 
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control participants matched for factors such as age and education. Further, we assess 
satisfaction upon receiving information and subsequent memory for information. Based 
on previous research suggesting deficits in reward anticipation among people with PD, 
we hypothesize that participants with PD will exhibit lower levels of curiosity and 
willingness to wait. As findings seem to suggest primarily deficits in reward anticipation 
and not in responsiveness to reward per se, we hypothesize that there will not be strong 
differences in ratings of satisfaction between participants with PD and controls. 
Additionally, given the circumscribed nature of learning-related deficits in PD, we expect 
no decrements in memory performance on our task. We were interested in asking 
questions about the effects of Parkinson’s disease generally on curiosity, so we pooled 
the participants ON and OFF medication into one group. However, an open question is 
whether acute administration of dopaminergic drugs affects performance on this task. 
Thus, despite small sample sizes, we report medication effects at the end of this study.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Thirty-three people with diagnoses of Parkinson’s disease and 36 age- and 
education-matched controls were recruited to participate in this study. Patients with 
Parkinson’s disease were recruited from the Center for Parkinson’s Disease and Other 
Movement Disorders at the Columbia University Medical Center Department of 
Neurology with the assistance of Dr. Lucien Cote and through PDtrials and Fox Trial 
Finder, online databases for volunteers interested in participating in research on 
Parkinson’s disease. Only patients in mild or moderate disease stages (Hoehn and Yahr 
stages 1-3; Hoehn & Yahr, 1967) were recruited. Control participants were recruited from 
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the community surrounding Columbia University and through Fox Trial Finder. All 
participants provided informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the 
Institutional Review Board of Columbia University. Participants were paid $12/hour for 
their participation.  
 
  In addition to the main curiosity task, participants completed a personal interview 
and a battery of neuropsychological tests. Exclusion criteria included general cognitive 
impairment (as evidenced by a score of 27 or lower on the Mini-Mental State 
Examination [MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1967]), signs of depression (a score 
of 7 or higher on the cognitive subscale of the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI; Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996]), and current use of certain medications known to affect dopamine 
function, such as amphetamines. Participants who were not able to complete both 
portions of the curiosity task, due to either time constraints or computer malfunction were 
also excluded from the analyses. The remaining 21 people with PD  (mean age = 62.57 ± 
5.13 years; 11 females, 10 males) and 28 control participants  (mean age = 65.11 ± 9.55 
years; 22 females, 6 males) did not differ in age, education, or measures of executive 
functioning (all p > 0.05; Table 1). However, the ratio of females to males was 
substantially higher in the control group, and participants with Parkinson’s disease had 
significantly higher total scores on the BDI (t(37.35) = -2.72, p = 0.01), though not on the 
cognitive subscale (Table 3.1).  
 
  People with Parkinson’s disease were randomly assigned to be tested either ON or 
OFF their medications. PD participants ON medication (n = 12) were tested within three 
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hours of their last dose. PD participants OFF medication (n = 9) were withdrawn from 
medication overnight and tested at least 16 hours after their last dose. PD participants ON 
medication were significantly older than those OFF medication (t(15.06) = 2.14, p = 
0.05). The mean number of errors on the National Adult Reading Test (NAART; Blair & 
Spreen, 1989) was significantly lower in the ON group, relative to the OFF group 
(t(13.21) = -2.17, p = 0.05).  
 
Table 3.1  
Participant information for participants with Parkinson’s disease and controls 
 Control 
(n = 28) 
PD 
(n = 21) 
PD-ON 
(n = 12) 
PD-OFF 
(n = 9) 
Age, years§ 65.11 ± 9.55 62.57 ± 5.13 64.58 ± 4.15 59.89 ± 5.09 
Female/Male 22/6 11/10 6/6 5/4 
Education, years 17.11 ± 2.62 16.55 ± 2.18 17.17 ± 2.07 15.69 ± 2.03 
MMSE 29.61 ± 0.62 29.45 ± 0.92 29.64 ± 0.64 29.22 ± 1.13 
COWAT 50.79 ± 12.27 50.30 ± 15.51 55.09 ± 14.20 44.44 ± 15.02 
NAART§ 16.11 ± 8.35 12.72 ± 6.65 9.56 ± 4.30 15.89 ± 7.06 
Digit span 12.75 ± 2.23 13.10 ± 2.35 13.67 ± 2.66 12.33 ± 1.56 
BDI** 4.04 ± 4.03 7.60 ± 4.61 7.55 ± 4.31 7.67 ± 4.94 
     Cognitive 1.32 ± 2.04 1.38 ± 1.46 1.45 ± 1.37 1.44 ± 1.57 
PD duration  6.24 ± 2.97 5.17 ± 1.82 7.67 ± 3.56 
**Denotes a significant difference between Control and PD participants at the p=0.01 level.  
§ Denotes a significant difference between PD participants “on” medication and PD participants “off” 
medication at the p=0.05 level.  
 
Materials. The main curiosity task (described in Procedure) was presented on Apple 
Macintosh computers, using Matlab (Natick, MA) software and the Psychophysics 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997) to present the stimuli and record responses. The task stimuli 
were 70 general interest trivia questions, culled from Internet sources and from Ken 
Jenning’s Trivia Almanac: 8,888 Questions in 365 Days (Jennings, 2008). Stimuli 
included such trivia questions as: “What proper name is spelled unusually, with a single n, 
both on the Liberty Bell and in the U.S. Constitution?” “What are divided by Bott’s dots?” 
and “What organ was the first to be successfully transplanted?” The order of the 
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questions and their associated wait delays (explained below) were counterbalanced across 
participants.  
 
Procedure. Participants completed the interview and neuropsychological battery and 
then participated in the curiosity task (Figure 3.1a). In this task, participants were 
presented with a trivia question and three possible response choices: Skip, Wait, or Know. 
Participants were instructed that if they knew the answer to the trivia question, they 
should press the key corresponding to Know. They were instructed to press the key 
corresponding to Skip if they did not know the answer and were not willing to wait to 
receive the answer. Participants were instructed to select the key corresponding to the 
Wait response if they did not know the answer to the question and were curious enough 
to wait for the designated delay time. The time delays associated with the Wait option 
were presented along with the question and varied in 5-second increments from 10 to 30 
seconds. Participants were given eight seconds to read the question and select a response.  
 
If participants chose Skip or Know, they were shown a brief fixation cross and 
then automatically advanced to the next question. If participants chose Wait, they saw a 
fixation cross for the duration of the wait time, and then the answer appeared. Upon 
choosing Wait, they could not then change their choice on that trial. Once the answer was 
displayed, participants could advance to the next question by key press. Participants were 
instructed at the outset that the entire experiment would last one hour, regardless of their 




  Upon completion of this task, participants were offered a break and then were 
shown the same 70 trivia questions they’d seen previously. For each trivia 
question/answer pair, they were asked to rate their curiosity upon seeing each question 
and their satisfaction upon seeing the answer. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale with 
1 being “Not at all curious” or “Not at all satisfied” and 7 being “Very curious” or “Very 
satisfied” (Figure 3.1b & 3.1c).  
 
 
Fig. 3.1.  
Experimental paradigm for testing the relationship between curiosity and willingness to 
wait for information. (a) In the primary curiosity task participants were shown a trivia question 
and three possible response choices. If participants chose Skip or Know, they automatically 
advanced to the next question. If they chose Wait, they had to wait the designated amount of time, 
and then the answer was displayed. After completion of the primary curiosity task, participants 
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were shown the same questions and asked to generate (b) curiosity ratings for the questions and 
(c) satisfaction ratings for the answers.  
 
Participants were told that they would be contacted for some follow-up questions 
in approximately one week. They were not informed of the nature of these follow-up 
questions but they were paid for their time in advance ($6 dollars for ~30 minutes). For 
this follow-up session, participants were emailed a list of the trivia questions they’d seen 
during the curiosity task and asked to type in the answers to those questions, as best they 
could remember. For a subset of participants, we read the questions aloud over the phone 
and recorded their verbal responses. A total of 13 participants with PD (7 ON and 6 OFF 
medication) and 25 controls participated in this memory portion of the study.  
 
Analyses.  
Curiosity and Waiting Behavior 
As previously, all Know trials were excluded from the analyses, as we were 
interested only in participants’ decisions to skip or wait. We first calculated each 
individual’s mean curiosity rating and proportion of choices to wait. We then ran t-tests, 
using Welch’s correction, to compare means between the control participants and 
participants with PD.  
 
To characterize the relationship between curiosity, decisions to wait, and PD 
status, we ran a mixed effects logistic regression model, with the intercept varying 
randomly by participant, the trivia item as a random effect, PD status (PD vs. control) as 
a fixed effect, and with the delay time associated with each question and the individual 
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curiosity rating each participant generated for each question as both random and fixed 
effects.  
 
To further explore potential differences in responsiveness to high- vs. low-value 
rewards, we then split participants’ trials into high- and low-curiosity trials and calculated 
each participant’s mean likelihood of waiting for high-curiosity information and low-
curiosity information. We then conducted a 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for 
an interaction between curiosity level (high vs. low) and group (PD vs. control).  
 
Because BDI scores did differ between groups, we sought to test whether BDI 
scores predicted waiting behavior. To do so, we ran a mixed effect logistic regression 
with the intercept varying randomly by participant, the trivia item as a random effect, 
BDI total score as a fixed effect, and with the delay time associated with each question 
and the individual curiosity rating each participant generated for each question as both 
random and fixed effects.  
 
Satisfaction Ratings 
To examine the effect of Parkinson’s disease on satisfaction, we calculated each 
individual’s mean satisfaction rating and ran a t-test, using Welch’s correction, 







We first calculated each participant’s proportion of correct responses in the 
subsequent memory test and ran a t-test, using Welch’s correction, comparing the means 
of the two groups.  
 
We then calculated the information prediction error (IPE) for each question for 
each individual by subtracting the individual’s curiosity rating from his/her satisfaction 
rating. We then ran a mixed effects logistic regression model, with intercept varying 
randomly by participant, the trivia item as a random effect, PD status as a fixed effect, 
and with the individual curiosity rating and the IPE each participant generated for each 
question as both random and fixed effects.  
 
Effects of Medication 
Although the sample sizes were small, we ran exploratory analyses to determine 
whether there was an influence of medication status at time of testing on curiosity and 
decisions to wait. We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess whether 
there were differences in the mean curiosity ratings among the three groups: controls, 
PD-ON, PD-OFF. As these analyses revealed significant differences, we then conducted 
subsequent Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference (HSD) tests to determine which 
groups differed significantly from one another. We conducted similar analyses to 





We then ran a mixed effects logistic regression model, with the intercept varying 
randomly by participant, the trivia item as a random effect, a 3-level term describing PD 
and medication status (control, PD-ON, PD-OFF) as a fixed effect, and with the delay 
time associated with each question and the individual curiosity rating each participant 
generated for each question as both random and fixed effects. We then directly compared 
participants with PD who were ON medication with those who were OFF, using a mixed 
effects logistic regression model, with intercept varying randomly by participant, the 
trivia item as a random effect, a 2-level term describing medication status (PD-ON, PD-
OFF) as a fixed effect, and with the delay time associated with each question and the 
individual curiosity rating each participant generated for each question as both random 













Curiosity and Waiting Behavior 
On average, people with Parkinson’s disease gave lower ratings of curiosity 
(t(46)=2.44, p=0.02) and chose to wait for fewer questions than control participants 
(t(46.65)=2.21, p=0.03; Figure 3.2). 
 
Fig. 3.2. 
Lower ratings of curiosity and fewer decisions to wait in PD. (a) Mean curiosity ratings for 
healthy controls and for Parkinson’s patients. Error bars represent standard errors of the means 


























































Participants’ likelihood of waiting to receive the answer was predicted by their 
curiosity about the question, the wait time associated with that question, and whether or 
not they had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease (e^β0 = 0.42, p = 0.12; e^βwait time = 




People with Parkinson’s disease are less likely to wait for information than controls. To 
display the effects of curiosity and PD status on waiting behavior, for graphing purposes, a pared-
down model was run separately for people with PD and controls.  
 
 
The difference in waiting behavior seemed driven by a difference in the likelihood 
of waiting for lower-curiosity information. Looking at each individual’s mean proportion 
of choices to wait for information that was either rated high or low in curiosity, we found 
a main effect of PD status (Control vs. PD; F=7.53, p <0.01), a main effect of curiosity 
category (High vs. Low; F=101.56, p < 0.001), and an interaction between the two terms 
(F=4.32, p=0.04; Figure 3.4).  
 
























People with Parkinson’s disease are less likely to wait for lower-curiosity information than 
controls. Mean proportions of choices to wait for participants for low- and high-curiosity 
information in each group. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Although total scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) did differ between 
groups, these scores were not predictive of waiting behavior (e^β0 = 0.36, p = 0.14; e^βwait 
time = 0.90, p<0.001; e^βcuriosity  = 4.31, p<0.001; e^βBDI-Total  = 0.87, p = 0.12).  
 
Looking only at questions for which participants chose to wait, there was no 
significant group difference in mean ratings of satisfaction upon receiving the answer 





























No disease-related differences in satisfaction ratings. Mean satisfaction ratings for answers 
received by control participants and participants with Parkinson’s disease. Error bars represent 
the standard errors of the mean (SEM).  
 
Subsequent Memory 
A total of 13 participants with Parkinson’s disease and 25 controls completed the 
memory portion of the study. Participants with Parkinson’s disease and controls did not 
differ in the mean proportions of answers remembered correctly (t(25) = 0.17, p = 0.86; 





























No disease-related differences in memory. Mean proportions of answers remembered correctly 
for each group. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Examining memory as a function of information prediction error (IPE), we find 
that curiosity and IPE predict subsequent memory, with no significant effect of PD status, 
and no significant interaction (e^β0 = 0.23, p < 0.001; e^βcuriosity  = 1.30, p < 0.001; e^βIPE  

































Memory predicted by IPE, not disease status. To display the effects of information prediction 
error (IPE) and PD status on subsequent memory, for graphing purposes, a pared-down model 
was run separately for people with PD and controls.  
 
Effects of Medication 
  Given the small sample sizes in each medication group, we combined the groups 
in our main analyses of curiosity, waiting behavior, and memory. Here, despite the small 
Ns, we examine whether there are medication effects on curiosity and willingness to wait.  
 
  An ANOVA revealed significant group differences in mean curiosity ratings 
(F(2,46) = 3.62, p = 0.03; Figure 3.8a). Subsequent Tukey’s Honest Significant 
Difference testing revealed a significant difference between controls (Mean (M) = 4.76) 
and participants with PD who were ON medication (M = 3.62; p = 0.03), but no 
significant differences between participants with PD who were OFF medication (M = 
4.36) and those who were ON medication (p = 0.37) or controls (p = 0.67).  
 





























  Additionally, there was a trend toward group differences in the mean proportions 
of choices to wait for information (F(2,46) = 2.89, p = 0.07; Figure 3.8b). Subsequent 
Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference testing revealed a trend toward a significant 
difference again between controls (M = 0.72) and participants with PD who were ON 
medication (M = 0.52; p = 0.05), but again no differences between participants with PD 
who were OFF medication (M = 0.63) and those who were ON (p = 0.53) and controls  
(p = 0.64).  
 
Fig. 3.8  
People with Parkinson’s disease ON medication gave lower ratings of curiosity and chose to 
wait for fewer answers than controls. (a) Mean curiosity ratings for control participants and for 
participants with Parkinson’s disease who were ON and participants with PD who were OFF 
medication. Error bars represent standard errors of the means (SEM). (b) Mean proportions of 
choices to wait for participants in each group. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Taking into account other factors affecting choices to wait, participants’ 
likelihood of waiting to receive the answer was predicted by their curiosity about the 
question, the wait time associated with that question, and whether or not they were a 
control participant (e^β0 = 0.07, p = 0.001; e^βwait time = 0.89, p<0.001; e^βcuriosity  = 4.40, 
p<0.001; e^βOn = 0.67, p = 0.71; e^βControl = 6.26, p = 0.05; Figure 3.9a). There was not a 













































time = 0.89, p<0.001; e^βcuriosity  = 4.26, p<0.001; e^βOn = 0.80, p = 0.75). A similar general 





Participants with Parkinson’s disease – whether ON or OFF medication – less likely to wait 
for information than controls. To display the effects of curiosity, PD, and medication status on 
waiting behavior, for graphing purposes, a pared-down model was run separately for people with 
PD ON medication, people with PD OFF medication, and controls. (b) To display the effects of 
curiosity and time on waiting behavior, a pared-down model was run separately for questions 

































































































Taken together, these findings suggest that curiosity is diminished in people with 
Parkinson’s disease, relative to age- and education-matched controls. Participants with 
Parkinson’s disease gave lower ratings of curiosity and showed less willingness to wait 
for information. However, looking exclusively at trials in which participants chose to 
wait, participants with Parkinson’s disease showed no differences in mean satisfaction 
ratings or memory performance. In other words, once they chose to wait, participants 
with PD showed no differences in satisfaction with the information or in their likelihood 
of remembering it. The difference lay in their initial ratings of curiosity and decisions to 
wait.  
 
The finding that Parkinson’s disease affected curiosity but not satisfaction echoes 
findings in the reward literature suggesting specific deficits in reward anticipation in 
Parkinson’s disease (e.g., Schott et al., 2007). These previous studies have demonstrated 
lower levels of striatal activity among people with Parkinson’s disease in the anticipation 
of rewards. Previous studies of curiosity have revealed enhanced striatal activity in 
healthy adults in the anticipation of information reward (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 
2009). Thus, it may be that differences in striatal function underlie the diminished 
curiosity observed in participants with Parkinson’s disease. Future studies might 
incorporate neuroimaging to examine the extent to which these differences in curiosity 





Although the sample sizes were small, we report medication-related differences in 
curiosity and willingness to wait, revealing that participants with PD who were ON 
medication gave lower mean curiosity ratings and chose to wait for the answer on fewer 
trials than control participants. Differences between participants with PD who were OFF 
medication and controls did not differ significantly on these gross measures. When 
examining mean likelihood of waiting based on curiosity, delay, and disease and 
medication status, however, participants with PD ON medication and participants with 
PD OFF medication did not differ significantly from each other but did differ from 
controls, showing lower likelihood of waiting.  
 
Although medication-related differences should be interpreted with caution, given 
the small sample sizes, it is interesting to note that participants with PD who were ON 
medication at the time of testing had a tendency to give lower ratings of curiosity and to 
make fewer decisions to wait, relative to controls, while participants with PD who were 
OFF medication at the time of testing did not differ significantly from controls on these 
measures. On one hand, these results seem surprising – we might expect that acute 
dopaminergic therapy would improve performance on this task and bring it more in line 
with that of controls, much like the effect of medication on motor control. In addition, 
studies of dopamine modulation in healthy controls show that L-DOPA administered in 
healthy adults actually enhances expectations of pleasure (Sharot, Shiner, Brown, Fan & 
Dolan, 2009) and increases reward-prediction-error-related activity and propensities to 
choose more rewarding options (Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). 
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On the other hand, this result comports with other findings suggesting that participants 
with PD tend to make poorer, less consistent, and more impulsive decisions while ON 
medication than while OFF medication (Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001, 
2003; Ryterska, Jahanshahi, & Osman, 2013). This apparent inconsistency may be related 
to the fact that the effects of dopaminergic drugs on cognitive performance depend on 
baseline levels of performance and often follow an inverted U-shaped function (Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011; Granon, Passetti, Thomas, Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2000; Kimberg, 
D'Esposito, & Farah, 1997). Indeed, the dopamine “overdose” hypothesis suggests that 
areas of the brain, such as the ventral striatum, that are relatively spared in the early 
stages of PD are “overdosed” with dopaminergic therapy, leading to deficits in 
performance on tasks requiring ventral striatal processing, such as stimulus-reward 
learning, gambling, reversal learning, and inter-temporal choice (Cools et al., 2001, 2003; 
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011). Previous studies have found a negative association 
between L-DOPA dosage and willingness-to-wait, suggestive of this dopamine 
“overdose” hypothesis (Nombela, Rittman, Robbins, & Rowe, 2014). Thus, it may be that 
acute dopaminergic therapy contributed to the lower willingness to wait for information 
in the ON group.  
 
However, it should be reiterated that the sample sizes were small, and there is 
significant heterogeneity in the level and nature of cognitive impairments in Parkinson’s 
disease (for a review, see Kehagia, Barker, & Robbins, 2010). It may be that the group 
differences based on medication reported here are more an artifact of individual 
differences. Future studies might test the same participants both ON and OFF medication 
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to better assess the acute effects of dopaminergic therapy. Furthermore, these medication-
based differences only held for the mean-level analyses of curiosity ratings and decisions 
to wait. When the full model – including all trials and additional factors such as delay – 
was analyzed, participants ON and OFF medication did not differ from each other, but 
they showed significantly lower likelihood of waiting for information than controls. This 
overall finding is in accord with those of Nombela and colleagues (2014), who, using a 
variety of behavioral, cognitive, and questionnaire measures of impulsivity, found that 
impulsivity is relatively common in PD, even absent a diagnosis of impulse control 
disorder.  
 
Importantly, participants with Parkinson’s disease did not show an overall lower 
willingness to wait for all information rewards. Rather, they showed markedly lower 
willingness to wait for lower-value rewards, i.e. low-curiosity information. We chose to 
use willingness to wait as it is a well-established measure of reward-motivated behavior 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), but the reward value of information 
could also be measured by willingness to exert effort to obtain it. While the costs – and, 
therefore, the discounting – associated with effort and delay are dissociable (for a 
discussion, see Westbrook & Braver, 2015), they elicit similar behavioral responses and 
both offer important ways to assess reward value (e.g., Hayden, Parikh, Deaner, & Platt, 
2007). And increased dopaminergic functioning is associated with the motivation to wait 
longer and exert more effort for rewards (Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & 
Green, 2009; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007; Wade, de Wit, & Richards, 
2000; Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, & de Wit, 2011).  
 
 73 
Indeed, burgeoning research into the role of dopamine in reward-motivated effort 
expenditure may offer an important interpretation of our data. In healthy adults, d-
amphetamine administration – which increases dopaminergic functioning – increases 
effort exertion, particularly under low-probability conditions (Wardle et al., 2011). 
Similarly, higher baseline dopaminergic functioning is associated with greater 
willingness to exert effort for rewards in low-probability contexts (Treadway et al., 
2012). Although research in this area is still in the early stages, there is evidence to 
suggest that people with Parkinson’s disease choose to expend less effort for lower 
rewards (Chong et al., 2015) and that they are able to modulate their effort so as to 
maximize effort during higher-reward trials (Schmidt et al., 2008). It is possible, then, 
that the choices of participants with Parkinson’s disease to wait primarily for higher-
value information, represent less an overall deficit in curiosity but could instead be 


























Few doubt the importance of curiosity, but most are hard-pressed to define it. The 
goal of this research program has been to better understand curiosity, by approaching it 
through the lens of reward. Conceptualizing curiosity as the motivation to obtain reward 
— where the reward is information — enables us to leverage important bodies of 
research in neuroscience and behavioral economics. And it motivates key questions 
related to reward anticipation, outcome, and learning, which we have sought to address 
through this research. 
 
 Across three studies, we used a novel variant of an inter-temporal choice task and 
found that people were more willing to wait for higher-value information, i.e., 
information about which they were more curious. Thus, using a variant of a classic 
behavioral economic measure of reward value, we provide evidence that information 
does function as a reward.  
 
 We further demonstrated the importance of valence in curiosity and learning, 
finding that younger adults were more likely to wait for and remember more positive 
information. We then showed that the positivity bias associated with older age extends to 





 While much of the prior work in this area has focused on the anticipation – what 
happens as people anticipate receiving information – here, we included a focus on the 
outcome – what happens when curiosity is or isn’t satisfied. We found evidence for an 
information prediction error, analogous to a reward prediction error, which represents the 
difference between the experienced and the anticipated value of the information reward. 
We demonstrated that these information prediction errors may be important factors in 
how curiosity drives learning.  
 
 We then provided behavioral evidence demonstrating that curiosity is not 
diminished but, rather, is enhanced with age, finding that older adults are more likely to 
give higher ratings of curiosity and to wait for information than younger adults.  
 
 And, finally, we find demonstrate a potential role for striatal function in curiosity, 
finding that people with Parkinson’s disease were less likely to give high curiosity ratings 
and less likely to wait for information. We found that this deficit is particular to the 
anticipation of reward (curiosity) and does not extend to the experience of the reward 
outcome (satisfaction). We further demonstrated that these differences were driven by the 
lower likelihood of participants with Parkinson’s disease to choose to wait for lower-
value (i.e., low-curiosity) information.  
 
Significance 
Curiosity lies at the crossroads of motivation, affect, cognition, and 
metacognition. It is an important psychological phenomenon that has garnered 
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surprisingly little research attention. Here we harness key findings from multiple 
disciplines to offer a new lens through which to explore curiosity. Understanding 
curiosity through the lens of reward-motivated behavior and learning offers important 
predictions about how curiosity is sparked and how it drives learning.  
 
Connecting curiosity to the reward system raises important questions about how 
curiosity changes across the lifespan and in psychiatric and neurological disorders 
characterized by dysregulation in dopamine function, which list deficits in reward 
processing and reward-motivated behavior among their symptoms. Given the connection 
between curiosity and various measures of health and well being (Kashdan & Steger, 
2007; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Swan & Carmelli, 1996), it is important to 
investigate how curiosity might be diminished by these disorders and how potentially 
diminished curiosity might affect quality of life.  
 
Of course, willingness to wait is just one dimension of reward-related behavior. In 
experiments in our lab not reported here, we have examined the extent to which 
participants are willing to spend money or effort (in the form of tedious button presses) to 
obtain information, finding further support for the information-as-reward 
conceptualization of curiosity. Activities such as appreciating humor (Mobbs, Greicius, 
Abdel-Azim, Menon, & Reiss, 2003), looking at attractive women (Hayden, Parikh, 
Deaner, & Platt, 2007), and acquiring a good social reputation (Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 
2008), have been found to conform to economic principles associated with reward or to 
implicate reward circuitry in the brain. It makes sense, then, that receiving information 
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about which we’re curious would show a similar relationship to reward, across a variety 
of tasks.  
 
 The finding that curiosity is related to willingness to wait links curiosity with 
previous research on delay of gratification and impulsivity. Loewenstein (1994) posited a 
connection between curiosity and impulsivity, maintaining that the subjective value of 
information can be high enough to motivate impulsive behaviors in an effort to obtain it. 
In support of his information gap theory, Loewenstein links the idea of curiosity as a 
temporary state of deprivation similar to that experienced by the child wanting to eat the 
marshmallow sitting in front of him (Loewenstein, 1994). Here, we reversed this 
connection between impulsivity and curiosity, instead asking people how long they’d be 
willing to be wait for information they wanted. We might expect, then, that the ability to 
delay gratification of information reward might be similar to the ability to delay 
gratification of monetary reward. Indeed, while we used reward as a means to better 
understand curiosity, we might imagine doing just the opposite: using information as a 
means to better understand reward. Childhood and adolescence tend to be associated with 
more impulsive behaviors (Mischel & Underwood, 1974; Schachar & Logan, 1990; 
Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, Albert, Cauffman, Banich, Graham, & Woolard, 
2008). However, these are also periods of time associated with higher levels of curiosity 
(Fowler, 1965; James, 1893; Kreitler, Zigler, & Kreitler, 1975). It would be interesting to 
see, then, the extent to which impulsivity might change as a function of the type of 
reward offered. Similarly, it might be interesting to examine reward-motivated behaviors 
in older adults using information instead of money, as older adults may value monetary 
 
 78 
rewards less and may be more motivated to allocate cognitive resources to a task with 
which they have a more personal connection (Hess, 2014). 
 
 The importance of valence in these studies is particularly interesting in the context 
of other literature related to inter-temporal choice and learning. Research suggests that 
dread is a powerful force and that people will choose to get negative outcomes over with 
as soon as possible (Berns, Chappelow, Cekic, Zink, Pagnoni, & Martin-Skurski, 2006). 
Conversely, the “pleasure paradox” suggests that uncertainty about a positive event, e.g., 
not knowing who gave you a gift or exactly how the heart-warming movie ends is 
actually pleasurable in and of itself (Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005). 
Research on inter-temporal choices involving gains vs. losses finds that losses are 
discounted less than gains and suggests that waiting for a loss is an entirely negative 
experience (dread), while waiting for a gain is a mix of positive (savoring) and negative 
(impatience) experiences (Hardisty, Frederick, & Weber, 2011). The stimuli used in these 
tasks were very weakly valenced, as they comprised trivia information about somewhat 
positive vs. somewhat negative events but were not highly emotional or evocative in 
either direction. Thus, they were not as comparable to the pleasure or pain associated 
with positive or negative life events used in previous studies. However, even with this 
minor manipulation, we found asymmetries in waiting behavior, in particular, a bias 
towards waiting for positive, relative to neutral, information. The role of valence is 
critical to learning as well. Recent studies have offered some important insights into the 
mechanisms underlying biases toward positive information and different tendencies to 
learn from positive vs. negative information (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Sharot, 
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Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012). Future studies might explore the role 
of these mechanisms in the positivity bias we’ve found in curiosity.  
 
 Loewenstein posited that a core feature of curiosity was its tendency to 
disappoint. Here we provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence to address this directly. 
We find that, contrary to Loewenstein’s hypothesis, curiosity is often satisfied. Further, 
we find that people are more likely to remember information when their curiosity is 
satisfied. These findings suggest that research into curiosity should take into account 
satisfaction, especially if the research examines learning and memory.  
 
The connection between curiosity and learning is particularly relevant from a 
developmental perspective. Research suggests that children as young as 16 months old 
use pointing as a means to express their curiosity, pointing at objects in their 
environments in search of information about them (Begus & Southgate, 2012). Childhood 
curiosity is an important predictor of academic success (Raine, Reynolds, Venables, & 
Mednick, 2002; von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). But, importantly, this 
curiosity must be nurtured. In a large study of adolescents, Kashdan and Yuen (2007) 
found that students high in curiosity who were educated in a challenging school 
environment showed superior performance on standardized national achievement tests. In 
contrast, the combination of high curiosity and less challenging school environments 
resulted in the worst performance and grades. Gaining greater knowledge about the 
nature of curiosity and its situational determinants could, therefore, have important 
implications for academic interventions and educational policies. If curiosity inspires 
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greater information seeking and if people demonstrate better memory for information 
they’re more curious about, educators could explore ways to inspire curiosity in the 
classroom. Several studies have aimed to apply different theories of curiosity to 
educational instruction, with promising results (e.g., Gentry et al., 2002; Klahr, 
Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011; Pluck & Johnson, 2011; Lowry & Johnson, 1981).  
 
Limitations 
While this research provides an interesting window into curiosity, it has several 
limitations.  
 
Curiosity is not a unitary construct. Here, we focused on epistemic curiosity and, 
more particularly, on curiosity about trivial information. We chose to use trivia, as it has 
no real utility and thus offers a conservative test of the information-as-reward hypothesis. 
However, it is important to consider whether other types of information, e.g., health 
information or social evaluative information, which may have greater utility and import, 
would evoke similar patterns of curiosity-motivated behavior. It would also be 
informative to consider situations in which curiosity is potentially maladaptive, e.g., 
morbid curiosity (Zuckerman & Litle, 1986), curiosity about missed opportunities 
(Caldwell & Burger, 2009; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007), or curiosity leading to problem 
behaviors (Howard & Zibert, 1990; Kolko & Kazdin, 1991; Lindgren, Mullins, 
Neighbors, & Blayney, 2010), and to examine the extent to which curiosity might be so 




There are also considerable individual differences in curiosity, both at the state 
and trait level, which were not captured in this research. This is particularly true in our 
studies of aging and Parkinson’s disease as large individual differences have been found 
in both populations (Halfmann, Hedgcock; Kable, & Denburg, 2015; Kehagia, Barker, & 
Robbins, 2010). With larger, more heterogeneous samples, we might be able to look at 
factors such as personality, mood, motivational orientation, culture, etc. and how they 
influence curiosity and decisions to wait for information.  
 
There are also likely large individual differences in how people define curiosity 
and how they rate it. Our studies relied on self-reports of curiosity and satisfaction 
ratings. For these ratings, we gave participants no specific instructions in terms of how to 
think about their curiosity and satisfaction, and it is likely that people approached these 
ratings in different ways. In the Appendix, we make a first attempt to examine the factors 
that people might take into account when assessing their own curiosity and satisfaction, 
but there is more work to be done in this area.  
 
Finally, a core feature of Loewenstein’s information gap theory is that our 
curiosity is driven in part by our predictions about the ability of a piece of information to 
resolve uncertainty. This idea applies a “reference-point concept” to curiosity, suggesting 
that we are sensitive to both absolute and relative gaps in information and arguing that we 
are more likely to be curious about information if we estimate that the probability of that 
information satisfying our curiosity is high (Loewenstein, 1994). In these studies, we 
asked people to select the Know option when they were certain they already knew the 
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answer. We did not verify their knowledge; we just eliminated those trials from the 
analysis. But prior knowledge is an important factor in curiosity and learning (Berlyne, 
1966; Loewenstein, 1994). Thus, future studies might examine how curiosity differs as a 
function of previous knowledge. For example, they might ask participants to guess the 
answers to questions and then analyze the extent to which having an incorrect or correct 
guess or no guess at all affects curiosity.  
 
Future Directions 
Conceptualizing curiosity as the motivation to receive an informational reward 
raises interesting questions about the relationship between curiosity and other 
contingencies known to affect motivation. Previous research suggests that feeling control 
over an outcome increases motivation (Eitam, Kennedy, & Higgins, 2013) and having a 
self-determined choice of tasks improves performance (Murayama et al., 2013). Indeed, 
simply having a choice between two options, even when having a choice does not affect 
actual reward outcomes, is rewarding (Leotti & Delgado, 2011) and restricting a person’s 
ability to choose is aversive (Leotti, Iyengar, Ochsner, 2010). In a study currently 
underway, we aim to examine the extent to which having a choice of what to learn affects 
curiosity and subsequent memory.  
 
The connection between curiosity and exploration is intuitively compelling. While 
epistemic curiosity and exploratory behavior are separate constructs, they share many 
attributes. We are currently examining the extent to which epistemic curiosity motivates 
perceptual exploration in search of information. In this study, we are examining not only 
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the extent to which people are motivated to explore in search of information but also the 
extent to which they remember the path that led to the information reward and the 
incidental stimuli they encountered along the way.  
 
The finding that information prediction errors enhance subsequent learning 
connects curiosity to an important body of research concerning reward prediction errors. 
Previous studies have found neural evidence suggestive of curiosity as the anticipation of 
reward (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009), but these studies have 
not examined differences in neural response to information with varying levels of 
satisfaction. Therefore, in future studies, we aim to incorporate neuroimaging to evaluate 
the extent to which information prediction errors evoke patterns of neural activity similar 
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Unpacking “curiosity” and “satisfaction” 
 
Curiosity is often conflated with concepts such as interest and intellectual 
engagement, both colloquially and in the scientific literature (for a review, see 
Grossnickle, 2014). And formal efforts to disentangle curiosity from other psychological 
constructs, such as openness to ideas and need for cognition, have proved difficult 
(Mussel, 2010). Indeed, part of the appeal of the information-as-reward hypothesis of 
curiosity is that it enables us, to some degree, to sidestep formal definitions of what 
curiosity is and instead focus on how curiosity works.  
 
In the preceding studies, we asked participants to rate their curiosity and 
satisfaction on 7-point Likert scales. We gave them no other instructions than just to 
think about they felt in the moment when they saw the question when rating curiosity and 
to think about how they felt in the moment when they saw the answer when rating 
satisfaction. Both “curiosity” and “satisfaction” are likely multidimensional constructs, 
and there are likely large individual differences in how people define these experiences.  
 
We, therefore, aimed to investigate how people defined these terms for 
themselves, endeavoring to identify common factors underlying ratings of curiosity and 
satisfaction in our experiments. In the following exploratory study, we first asked a group 
of participants open-ended questions about how they gave their ratings of curiosity and 
satisfaction. We then used these responses to identify potential common factors 
underlying curiosity and satisfaction and tested the extent to which these common factors 
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were associated with ratings of curiosity and satisfaction among a separate group of 
participants.  
 
Participants. Participants were 387 adults in the United States over the age of 18, 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk labor market platform between April 3, 
2015 and April 8, 2015. Participants were compensated $3 for taking the survey.  
 
Procedure. After providing consent, participants were shown two practice trivia 
question-and-answer sets before completing the actual survey. The survey comprised five 
trivia question-and-answer sets, drawn randomly from a pool of 50 question-and-answer 
sets, which had been chosen from previous experiments because they offered a range of 
curiosity and satisfaction ratings. The procedure was based loosely on that of Holtgrave 
and Weber (1993). Participants were first shown a trivia question and asked to rate their 
curiosity on a scale from 0-100, with 0 being “Not at all curious” and 100 being “Very 
curious.” Then, they were shown a series of 12 statements (Table 4.1) describing factors 
previous associated with curiosity ratings (see Pre-experiment generation of factors 
below). For each statement, they were asked to use a slider to make a rating from 0 to 
100, with 0 meaning “I do not agree at all/This statement does not apply at all” and 100 
meaning “I completely agree/This statement completely applies.” Participants were asked 
to evaluate each statement independently, thinking about their personal attitude toward 
the information, and to report the extent to which it applied to the current trivia question. 
Then, participants were shown the same trivia question along with its answer. They were 
first asked to report how satisfied they were with the answer, again on a scale from 0-100. 
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And they were then asked to think about their personal attitudes towards the answer to 
the question and report the extent to which a separate series of 11 statements (Table 4.2) 
applied to the current question-and-answer pair.   
 
Pre-experiment generation of factors. In a separate study, which was not discussed in 
the preceding chapters but which also involved Likert-scale curiosity and satisfaction 
ratings, we asked participants (N = 95; mean age = 21.33 ± 4.64 years; 65 females, 30 
males) to answer the following questions about their experience in the task:  
 
1. When you were asked how curious you were to find out the answer, how did you 
go about making your rating on the 1-7 scale?  
2. Thinking back to the questions you were most curious about, why were you 
curious about them?  
3. Turning to satisfaction, how did you rate how satisfied you were with the answer?  
4. Thinking back to the answers you were most satisfied with, what made you 
satisfied?  
 
We then collected the responses, and a research assistant identified factors that 
occurred most frequently among participants. Factors associated with curiosity ratings 
included beliefs that the information was fun, novel, or about a topic of general interest 
and desires to share the information or to confirm guesses. Factors associated with 




Using these factors, we created statements regarding curiosity (Table A.1) and 
satisfaction (Table A.2) with which participants could agree or disagree and used these in 
the current study.  
Table A.1 
Curiosity-related statements 
This question is about a general topic that interests me.  
This question is related to other information I know.  
It would be important for me to know the answer to this question.  
It would be useful for me to know the answer to this question. 
It would be fun for me to know the answer to this question. 
Not knowing the answer would be uncomfortable for me/would make me feel frustrated. 
I would like to share this information with a friend.  
If I don’t find out the answer now, I will want to look it up later.  
I am likely to remember this information in the future.  
I think I know the answer or have a guess about the answer, and I want to know if I’m 
right.  





This answer/information is useful. 
This answer/information is fun.  
This answer/information is important.  
This answer/information is surprising or unexpected.  
This answer/information made me laugh or smile.  
I would like to share this information with a friend.  
I learned something new.   
This answer confirmed what I thought/my guess was correct.   
This answer did not confirm what I thought/my guess was incorrect.   
I am likely to remember this answer/information in the future.   
This information is new to me.  
 
 
Responses were eliminated if participants answered 0 or 100 to all or all but one 
of the response options.  
 
To evaluate the factors predicting curiosity ratings, we first aggregated all of the 
curiosity data and attempted to fit a regression model using curiosity rating as the 
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response variable and a subset of the other variables as explanatory variables. As this 
analysis was exploratory in nature, we performed variable selection such that we 
minimized Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), a process that tends to favor 
more parsimonious models. We also performed variable selection using stepwise 
regression, a forward selection process, which enables previously included variables to be 
dropped if they no longer improve the model fit. Using the variables determined by these 
methods, we then ran a regression model and reported the beta values for each variable in 
the model. We then ran a similar set of analyses to evaluate the factors predicting 
satisfaction ratings.  
 
Out of the 387 participants, 44 were eliminated from the final results because 
participants did not complete the survey and 14 were eliminated because participants 
skipped one or more of the questions in the survey, leaving 329 participants included in 
the final results. 
 
First looking at curiosity, variable selection to minimize BIC revealed that several 
models would be equally good fits, specifically those including the variables of “This 
question is about a general topic that interests me,” “This question is related to other 
information I know,” “It would be fun for me to know the answer to this question,” “If I 
don’t find out the answer now, I will want to look it up later,” “I am likely to remember 
this information in the future,” and “This information is new to me” (Figure A.1). Of 
note, this model has the same BIC as several other models that additionally include 
variables such as, “It would be useful for me to know the answer to this question,” “It 
 
 111 
would be important for me to know the answer to this question,” “I would like to share 
this information with a friend,” and “I think I know the answer or have a guess about the 




Variable selection for curiosity factors.  
 
Stepwise regression revealed the following as the best-fitting model: β0 = 18.96, 
p<0.001; βFun = 0.39, p<0.001; βLookItUp  = 0.14, p<0.001; βNewInfo = 0.11, p<0.001; 
βGeneralTopic = 0.25, p<0.001; βRelatedInfo = -0.14, p<0.001; βLikelyRemember = 0.14, p<0.001; 
βKnowAnswer = -0.05, p = 0.01; βShare = -0.05, p = 0.04; βImportant = 0.05, p = 0.07 (Figure 
A.2). Variance inflation factors for each variable were below 10, suggesting a lack of 
multicollinearity among variables. Feeling that the information was new, important, and 
fun was associated with higher ratings of curiosity. Similarly, feeling that the information 






















































































likely to look it up, and that they’d be likely to remember the information in the future 
were associated with higher curiosity ratings. In contrast, wanting to share the 
information, wanting to confirm an initial guess, and feeling that the information was 
related to other information participants knew were all negatively associated with 






Factors associated with curiosity ratings.  
 
Turning to satisfaction, variable selection to minimize BIC revealed that several 
models would be equally good fits, specifically those including the variables, “This 
answer/information is useful,” “This answer/information is fun,” “This 
answer/information is surprising or unexpected,” “I learned something new,” and “I am 
likely to remember this answer/information in the future” (Figure A.3).  
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
I will want to look up info
I'm likely to remember info
A general topic of interest
It would be fun to know
Related to other info         
I think I know info
I'd like to share info










Variable selection for satisfaction factors.  
 
Stepwise regression revealed that the best-fitting model was the following:  
β0 = 35.25, p<0.001; βImportant = -0.06, p = 0.07; βNotConfirmed  = 0.01, p = 0.59; βSmile =  
-0.06, p<0.01; βShare = -0.09, p<0.001; βConfirmed = 0.12, p<0.001; βUseful = 0.16, p<0.001; 
βSurprising = -0.17, p<0.001; βLearned = 0.23, p<0.001; βLikely = 0.22, p<0.001; βFun = 0.29, 
p<0.001 (Figure A.4). Variance inflation factors for each variable were below 10, 
suggesting a lack of multicollinearity among variables. The belief that the information 
was fun and useful and that it helped them to learn something new was associated with 
higher ratings of satisfaction. Participants’ feelings that they were likely to remember the 















































































































associated with satisfaction ratings. Interestingly, feeling that the information was 
surprising or that it made them laugh or smile or that they’d like to share the information 




Factors associated with satisfaction ratings.  
 
This is an initial, exploratory study, and, ultimately, the findings reinforce the 
notion that curiosity and satisfaction are complicated constructs. We found a great deal of 
consistency in curiosity and satisfaction ratings across our previous studies. However, 
these findings suggest that beneath this consistency may lie considerable variability.  
 
In this study, we used a range of trivia question-and-answer pairs, covering a 
variety of topics. In Chapters 1 and 2, we demonstrated the importance of the valence of 
information, but valence is just one way in which information can be categorized. It is 
likely that different types of information – from peculiar animal fact to historical trivia – 
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
My guess was right
Info made me smile
I'd like to share info
Information is useful
Surprised                     
Learned something new





might inspire curiosity in different ways. Thus, an interesting avenue for future research 
would be to examine the ways in which curiosity, satisfaction, and behavior may differ, 
depending on the type of information involved.  
 
Further, there are likely considerable individual differences in how people make  
judgments of curiosity and satisfaction. For example, for some, it may matter more that 
information is important; for others, it may matter more that it’s fun. It would, therefore, 
be interesting to examine the ways in which these subjective valuations differ as a 
function of individual difference variables, such as age, gender, culture, motivational 
orientation, personality, etc.   
 
 Finally, these findings suggest an important role for metacognitive judgments in 
curiosity and satisfaction. People reported higher curiosity when the information was 
about a general topic of interest and when it was new to them. They reported higher 
satisfaction when they had guessed correctly about the information and when they felt 
they had learned something new. Self-reported likelihood of remembering information 
was also positively associated with ratings of curiosity and satisfaction. Future studies 
might explore these connections further, examining the ways in which metacognitive 
judgments about one’s previous knowledge may inform curiosity and the extent to which 
having a guess might increase curiosity. They might also further test the information-gap 
theory, examining the extent to which curiosity and satisfaction may fluctuate as a 
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